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TAKING UNCERTAINTY SERIOUSLY:




By R. MICmAEL M'GoNIGLE, T. LYNNE JAMmSON,
MuIwocI K. McAuSimR, Am RANDALL M. PmERMAW
This paper contrasts two paradigms of
environmental regulatory decision making, "permissive
regulation" and "preventative design," with respect to
their treatment of scientific and legal uncertainty and
the allocation of legal standards and burdens of proof.
"Permissive regulation," which is the predominant
approach in Canada, suffers two types of statistical
errors. A type I error occurs when, for example, a
pollution control device is unjustly imposed on an
industry. A type H error occurs when no action is taken
to control an industry when, in fact, damage is taking
place. Concern to prevent type I errors often leads to
type II errors. Attempts to resolve these problems
through incremental changes in legislation and policy
have generally failed. This article illustrates the
scientific and regulatory problems associated with
'permissive regulation" through an analysis of
environmental common law, legislation, and regulation.
Protection of environmental quality requires
regulatory decision making rooted in the principles of
precautionary, preventative action that tends to
minimize costly type H errom With the "preventative
design" approach now being used in several
jurisdictions, the regulatory burden of proving harm is
shifted from regulators to the polluters who must
demonstrate safety. European and American initiatives
as well as international agreements illustrate the
historical development and implementation of this
"preventative design" perspective. This article suggests
that Canadian legislation and regulations be written
with this approach.
Cot article compare deux paradigmes concernant
la prise de d.cision en matitre do raglementation
environnementale : la 4raglementation permissive* et
le 4modale pr~ventif*, quant h leur traitement de
rincertitude l6gale et scientifique et quant h l'allocation
de normes lgales et de fardeaux de preuve. La
4rglementation permissive*, comme m6thode
pr6dominante au Canada, est marquie par deux types
d'erreurs statistiques. Une erreur de type I a lieu
quand, par exemple, un dispositif de contr6le de la
pollution est impos4 injutement A une industrie. Une
erreur de type IH se manifesto par manque do contrle
d'une industrie causant des dommages i
l'environnement. En gn~ral, les tentatives visant AL
r~soudre ces problames en accroissant la quantit6 do
lois et de politiques ont Echou6. En analysant la
common law, les lois, et les raglements en droit
environnemental, cot article montre les problames
scientifiques ct raglementaires que pose la
4macglementation permissive*.
Pour prot~ger l'environnement, la prise de
decision en matiare do raglementation devrait s'axer
sur des principes raction pr~ventive, qui tend ar6duire
les erreurs coiateuses de type IL Plusleursjuridictions
utillsent maintenant une approche prEventive; le
fardeau de preuve raglementaire est transfdr6 aux
poliueurs qui doivent d~montrer la s&curitE de leur
processus. Les initiatives europ~ennes et amfricaines
ainsi quo les accords internationaux illustrent le
dfveloppement historique et la raise en place do la
perspective du 4mod~le pr~ventif. Cet article propose
quc les lois et raglements canadienas soient 6crits selon
cette approche.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the growing scale and impact of the industrial
use of hazardous substances have raised concerns in Canada and around
the world. After decades of widespread usage, compounds once thought
to be harmless, like polychlorinated biphenyls (PcBs), dioxins, and
chloro-fluorocarbons (cFcs), have become household names because of
increasing evidence of their serious and, in some cases, potentially
catastrophic effects.1 Many industrial activities and by-products have
followed a pattern of an initial judgement of safety, followed by
uncertainty and circumstantial evidence of harm, acrimonious debate,
and finally hard evidence of detrimental effects. With the dramatic
increase in recent years in the use of artificial chemical substances, a
regulatory approach that permits specific discharges of industrial
by-products, subject to an "acceptable" limit that is based on uncertain
scientific information, may no longer be adequate for assuring
acceptable environmental quality.
In this paper, we shall examine this situation and the challenge
that it poses for Canadian law. Of particular concern is the pattern of
scientific inference and legal regulation that underlies our current
control strategy for industrial pollution. This pattern has focused largely
on what we know, rather than what we do not know; that is, it has
emphasized cause-and-effect relationships that can be demonstrated
between substances and the environment, and not relationships that may
exist but which, despite extensive scientific testing, remain hidden. This
pattern applies to more than just toxic substances. Failure to detect an
effect when one exists is a common problem associated with the widely
used, discharge-based regulatory approach in Canada, the approach that
we call "permissive regulation." Although this problem also pervades
other sectors, such as fisheries management and timber harvesting, it has
been rarely acknowledged by scientists, legislators, environmental
decision makers, or the judiciary in Canada. In contrast, a new
regulatory approach oriented to the character of the whole industrial
process, an approach that we call "preventative design," is being
developed in other jurisdictions to deal with precisely this problem. To
contrast these approaches, we must have an understanding of the
1 These potential effects are suspected at the large-scale environmental level (crcs depleting
the global ozone layer, or carbon dioxide (co-) leading to the greenhouse effect) and also frequently
on small scales. See, for example, J. Cummins, "Extinction: The PcB Threat to Marine Mammals"
(1988) 18:6 Ecologist 193.
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scientific basis of contemporary regulation, of the regulatory character of
present Canadian law, and of the new initiatives being taken elsewhere.
II. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
The regulatory framework for environmental protection in
Canada has been widely noted as placing an onerous burden on those
seeking to protect the environment, the effect of which is a perhaps
unintended but, nonetheless, de facto bias in favour of industrial
freedom of action. 2 More specifically, the tradition of making legal
inferences (including, most importantly, the allocation of the burden of
proof) is often so restrictive that, despite strong suspicions of harm, clear
environmental degradation or damage to human health must occur
before legal action can be taken.
This regulatory situation reflects, in part, a lack of attention to
"statistical power" (a critical component of scientific experimental
design), which describes in mathematical terms the probability of an
experiment or monitoring programme actually detecting an effect where
one existsO Most scientific environmental studies that fail to detect an
effect of some action or substance do not evaluate the level of statistical
power even though it may be very low for a variety of reasons. 4 Yet
2 These concerns are expressed, for example, in D. Estrin et aL, eds, Environment on Trial:A
Citizen's Guide to Ontario Environmental Law (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Research
Foundation, 1974); D.P. Emond, Environmental Law and Poliy: A Retrospective Examination of the
Canadian Experience (Ottawa: Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects, 1985); JF. Castrilli, "Control of Toxic Chemicals in Canada: An Analysis of Law and
Policy" (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall LJ. 322; and T.F. Schrecker, Political Economy of Environmental
Hazards (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1984).
3 The extent of this judicial neglect has been made apparent by a recent computer analysis of
several decades of American judicial decision making. Over that time, the concept was addressed
only three times at the district, appeals, and Supreme Court levels: SE. Fienberg, ed., The Evolving
Role of StatisticalAssessments as Evidence in Courts (New York. Springer-Verlag, 1989) at & For
one consideration of statistical power in judicial decision making, see R. Goldstein, "Two Types of
Statistical Errors in Employment Discrimination Cases" (1985-86) 26 Jurimetrics J. 32 at 35.
4 These reasons are discussed in detail below. For a survey of this situation, see R.M.
Peterman, "Statistical Power Analysis Can Improve Fisheries Research and Management" (1990)
47 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. SCI. 2 at 4 [hereinafter "Statistical Power Analysis"]. For papers noting the
common absence of statistical power analysis from studies, see CA. Toft & PJ. Shea, "Detecting
Community-Wide Patterns: Estimating Power Strengthens Statistical Inference" (1983) 122 Am.
Nat. 618; R.H. Green, "Power Analysis and Practical Strategies for Environmental Monitoring"
(1989) 50 Envtl. Res. 195; D.F. Parkhurst, "Statistical Hypothesis Tests and Statistical Power in
Pure and Applied Science" in G.M. von Furstenberg, ed.,Acting Under Uncertainty: Mulfidisciplinay
Conceptions (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1990) 181; and R.M. Peterman, "The Importance of
[voL 32 No. 1
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because statistical power has rarely been evaluated, some past decisions
were not justified. The decisions to license various pesticides on the
strength of only limited conclusions, which are now known to be wrong,
serve as one example.5 Because so many causal links are scientifically
unprovable in the legal sense of "cause in fact," this situation has led
some (especially American) commentators to question whether toxic
substances can be well regulated without restructuring the rules
concerning the burden of proof.6 What this restructuring might involve
has scarcely been considered in the legal literature, especially in
Canada.7
Reporting Statistical Power. The Forest Decline and Acidic Deposition Example" (1990) 71
Ecology 2024 [hereinafter "The Importance of Reporting Statistical Power"]. See also J.P. Hayes,
"The Positive Approach to Negative Results in Toxicology Studies" (1987) 14 Ecotox. & EnvtL
Safety 73. Hayes notes at 73 that, in the field of toxicology, negative results (or failure to detect an
effect) "often lead to the (sometimes invalid) inference that a suspected toxicant does not
significantly deleteriously affect organisms or biological systems," and that such results may have an
important influence on decisions regarding the regulation of toxic substances.
5 See, for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Suspended, Cancelled and
Restricted Pesticides, 5th ed., by the Office of Compliance Monitoring. Office of Pesticides and Toxic
Substances (Washington, D.C.: 1990).
6 See T.W. Koelling, "The Burden of Proof in Environmental and Public Health litigation"
(1981) 49 U. Mo. Kan. City L Rev. 207; HA. Latin, "The 'Significance' of Toxic Health Risks: An
Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty" (1982) 10 Ecology L, Q. 339; T. Page, "A
Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks" (1978) 7 Ecology LQ. 207 [hereinafter "A
Generic View"]; and T. Page, "A Framework for Unreasonable Risk in the Toxic Substances
Control Act" in WJ. Nicholson, ed., Management of Assessed Risk for Carcinogens, Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 363 (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1981) 145
[hereinafter "A Framework"]. For a recent survey of the issue, see A.C. Floumoy, "Legislating
Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking" (1991) 15
Harv. EnvtL L Rev. 327.
7 A notable exception to this is the landmark study by P. Muldoon & M. Valiante, Toxic Water
Pollution in Canada. Regulatory Principles for Reduction and Elimination With Emphasis On
Canadian Federal and Ontario Law (Calgary: Canadian Institute for Resources Law, 1989).
Recently, the West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation published an excellent critique
and proposal: C. Sandborn, W.J. Andrews & B. Wylynko, Preventing Toxic Pollution: Toward a
BrXsh Columbia Strategy (Vancouver. 1991).
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A. Uncertainty in Statistical Procedures
There are two contrasting approaches to making scientific
inferences from uncertain information. The most common approach
aims to minimize the probability of incorrectly concluding that there is an
effect when one actually does not exist. In the scientific and statistical
literature, this is referred to as a "type I" error.8 Such an error could
lead to a regulatory "false positive" in which an agency erroneously
concludes that a cause-effect relationship exists and imposes
unnecessary restrictive regulations. The second, much rarer, approach
aims to minimize the probability of incorrectly concluding that there is no
effect when one actually exists; that is, a "type II" error. This approach to
uncertainty in scientific inference attempts to minimize the chances of a
-regulatory "false negative" occurring, in which case regulations that
should be imposed are not because it is incorrectly assumed that no
effect exists.?
8 WJ. Dixon & FJ. Massey, Jr., Introduction to StatisticalAnalysis, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-
Hill, 1983) at 87. See also Parkhurst, supra note 4, passhn.
9 When designing an experiment to determine whether a substance or industrial activity has a
detrimental effect on the environment or public health, standard research methodology uses data to
evaluate quantitatively two different hypotheses. Traditionally, the null hypothesis (H,,) refers to
the hypothesis that there is no effect; the alternative hypothesis (HA) is that there is an effect. The
relevant data are analyzed to see if they reject, or are consistent with, the null hypothesis. If the
data are not consistent with the null hypothesis, then it is rejected.
Four possible outcomes exist for the hypothesis test, depending on the true "state of nature"
and the type of decision made by the researcher. If the true state of nature is that the substance
does not have a detrimental effect (null hypothesis is actually true) and the researcher does not
reject the null hypothesis (Table 1, Box 1), then no error is made. However, given this true state of
nature, a type I error (Table 1, Box 2) occurs if the researcher, incorrectly finding the data to be
inconsistent with the null hypothesis, rejects H0 and concludes that the alternative hypothesis-that
there is an effect-is true. This leads to a "regulatory false positive."
Alternatively, if the true state of nature is that the substance does have a detrimental effect
(null hypothesis is actually false), and the researcher does reject the null hypothesis (Table 1, Box 4),
then a correct decision has been made. In contrast, a type H error occurs in situations in which the
substance truly does have a detrimental effect, but the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis
and concludes that there is no effect (Table 1, Box 3). This leads to the "regulatory false negative."
Environmental Decision Making
TABLE 1
Decision Table for Hypothesis Testing
(Associated probabilities are in parentheses) o
Decision
True State of Nature
Null hypothesis true





















In environmental management, scientific data are gathered on
hypotheses and subjected to a statistical analysis, after which some
inference is drawn concerning the null hypothesis. Most standard
statistical inference procedures aim to minimize the chance of
committing type I errors. Scientists have traditionally been quite
conservative about making type I errors, choosing small values for the
probability (called alphall) that an apparent cause-effect link found in
the data could be explained by chance alone (Le., that the observed
effect could have been generated by chance alone if the null hypothesis
(IL) were true). This alpha value is usually equal to 0.05; that is, there
would be a 5 per cent chance of obtaining results as observed if the null
10After Toft & Shea, supra note 4.
11 Alpha represents a probability ranging from 0 to 1 of committing a type I error. The
conservative attitude reflects a scientific tradition of wanting to minimie the chance of mistakenly
concluding that the process or substance being studied has some effect. By choosing a small value
for alpha there is a low probability that they will incorrectly reject Ho and accept HA. Thus, an
alpha value of 0.05 means that there is only a S per cent chance that the researcher may be incorrect
in rejecting H0, Le., that the researcher may have committed a type I error.
1994]
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hypothesis were true. Some toxicological studies set alpha as low as 0.01.
If the statistical analysis of the data produces a probability of obtaining
the results under Ho (P value) less than the pre-set alpha value, the
results are said to be "statistically significant" and the researcher rejects
H0 and accepts the alternative hypothesis (HA) that there is an effect.
Of greater significance to our discussion, however, is when the
statistical analysis gives a P value greater than the preset alpha value.
Here the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis of no effect;
however, most scientists go further and actually conclude that the
observations are due to chance alone, and that the null hypothesis is
true.j2 This conclusion (which is especially common when non-scientists
contemplate the implications of technical studies) is usually unjustified
and may be dangerous because it can lead to a type II error-the belief
that there is no effect when one actually exists-as explained below.
Statistical procedures exist for computing the probability of a
type II error13 but, as discussed above, scientists are not often aware of
them. This probability of a type II error is symbolized as beta which, like
alpha, ranges between 0 and 1. A low beta value (for example, 0.1)
means that there is a low probability (10 per cent chance in this case) of
making a type II error. Because statistical power is, by definition,
1.0-beta, this experiment would have "high power," or a 90 per cent
chance of detecting the effect if it exists at some specified level.
Conversely, a high beta value (for example, 0.6) indicates a high
probability (60 per cent chance) of making a type II error. This
experiment would have only a 40 per cent chance of detecting the
specified effect; that is, it would have a low power. Note that if decision
makers wish to be as careful about averting type II errors as they are
now about averting type I errors, the desired beta should be the same as
the preset alpha, usually 0.05. Therefore, they should set the desired
statistical power at 0.95. However, there is, as yet, no generally agreed
upon level for beta, but a value of 0.1 or less is clearly advisable.
Statistical power is a function of four variables: sample size (a
larger sample size increases power); sample variance (which includes
natural variability in the sample and measurement error-lower variance
12 The difference between "failing to reject" and "accepting" Ho, is critical, of course, as the
former conclusion means that the evidence was simply unable to reject He, whereas the latter
suggests that the data conclusively show H. to be true.
13 For detailed discussion of these procedures, see Dixon & Massey, supra note 8; BJ. Winer,
Statistical Principles in Erperimental Design, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971); and . Cohen,
Statistical PowerAnalysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2d ed. (Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum,
1988) at c. 1.
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gives higher power); effect size (the larger the true effect for which one
is testing, the higher the power); and alpha.14 This last variable is
particularly important because it points to a trade-off between type I and
type II errors for a given experimental design. That is, if a scientist is
rigorous in minimizing the probability of making a type I error and sets a
very low alpha, the power of the experiment will automatically be
reduced, all else being equalj-5 In short, alpha and beta are inversely
related-there is usually a trade-off between the probability of making
type I and type II errors. Therefore, by trying to minimize the chance of
making a type I error, scientists are inadvertently increasing the chances
of missing some effect. The only way to reduce the effects of this inverse
relation is by increasing the sample size or by improving the
experimental design to increase statistical power.
This trade-off is critical and must be accounted for when making
regulatory environmental decisions. For instance, imagine that a
toxicologist especially wants to prevent making false claims about the
mortality rate of test animals caused by a particular pesticide. If an
especially low alpha value of 0.01 is set so as not to have more than a 1
per cent chance of incorrectly finding an adverse effect, then any P value
calculated from the experimental data that is greater than 0.01 would
mean that the researcher would not conclude that an effect exists, and
may conclude that one does not exist. In other words, the more cautious
the experimenter is to avert type I errors (or, to put it another way, to
prevent finding an "innocent" pesticide "guilty"), the higher the chance
of making a type II error (that is, of letting a harmful pesticide "go
free"). Unfortunately, in such situations in most fields of medical and
environmental research, scientists fail to calculate beta16 and regularly
assert that there is no effect without also stating the probability of
14 See "Statistical Power Analysis," supra note 4, for a complete discussion of the relations
between these variables and statistical power. Peterman works through a hypothetical example of a
statistical analysis and type I and type II errors at 3-5.
15 See Cohen, supra note 13; and "The Importance of Reporting Statistical Power," supra note
4 at 2026.
16 See A. Endo, "Determination of sample sizes for the screeing [sk] test of teratogenecity"
(1976) 14 Terat. 238 (abstr.); M. Yasuda, "The Importance of Type I Error in Toxicological
Studies" (1979) 4 J. Toxicol. Sci. 288 (abstr.); T. Tacubana & S. Kiyono, "Safety Evaluation of
Compounds and Statistical Tpe II Error" (1980) 20 Congen. Anom. 157; W. Stucky & H.D.
Unkelbach, "Testing Transition Rates in Generalized Binomial Models" (1980) 22 Biom. J. 725;
Toft & Shea, supra note 4; and C.G. Brown et a., "The Beta Error and Sample Size Determination
in Clinical Trials in Emergency Medicine" (1987) 16 Annals of Emerg. Med. 183.
1994]
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error.1 7 Because scientists rarely think of statistical power, law makers
and regulators are not aware of its serious implications, a situation which
has resulted in many instances of serious, sometimes irreversible,
environmental degradation.
B. Uncertainty in Research Procedures
Despite considerable scientific data about the dynamics of
natural and human-disturbed environmental systems, large gaps in our
understanding still exist. Because of the complexity of most ecological
systems, it is sometimes difficult either to identify causes of past
observations or to forecast future responses to a proposed activity.
Many features of ecological systems can increase the variance of data so
as to reduce the statistical power of a study, thus posing interpretive
difficulties for regulators who depend on scientific studies/ 8
1. Laboratory studies
Because researchers often fail to report that studies have low
statistical power, tests that supposedly identify a no-adverse-effect level
may be misleading.1 9 For example, controversy has long surrounded the
17 See "Statistical Power Analysis," supra note 4 at 5. In a survey of several recent volumes of
two prominent fisheries science journals, it was found that of 160 papers, with at least one
occurrence of not rejecting a null hypothesis, there were 142 assertions of no effect. Only 3 of these
papers mentioned statistical power (the probability of correctly detecting an effect if one exists).
1 8 Variability and uncertainty in natural ecological systems may result from differences among
age groups, individual responses to disturbances, variable responses to disturbances in different
spatial locations, lag times between disturbances and effects, cumulative and synergistic effects,
blomagnification, and unknown mechanisms of responses (nonlinear and threshold responses).
Biomagnification refers to the process by which toxins are absorbed by living tissues, and because of
their resistance to change, accumulate in greater concentrations in animals than in their food. This
can in turn lead to progressively greater concentrations of toxins at higher levels of the food chain.
Synergism refers to the process by which two or more pollutants released separately into the
environment may act together, or may combine to form a new substance, resulting in harmful
effects that are greater than the sum of the effects of their component parts. Cumulative effects
refers to the results of several individual environmental developments. Thresholds of response are
those levels at which a response, in terms of measurable harm to a species or ecosystem, is detected.
In some instances these mechanisms of response exhibit a linear relationship between dose and
response. In others, a nonlinear or exponential dose-response curve is seen. For many toxins the
nature of the dose-response curve remains uncertain, thus creating regulatory difficulties.
19 See KG. Brown & L.S. Erdreich, "Statistical Uncertainty in the No-Observed-Adverse-
Effect-Level" (1989) 13 Fund. & Applied Toxia 235, for a discussion of how decision makers can be
misled by results from experiments designed to estimate the highest dose of a chemical that shows
108
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application of the results of animal studies for carcinogenicity to human
beings, although authoritative reviews of this controversy have affirmed
the reliability of such extrapolations20 Laboratory studies of industrial
chemicals have also been criticized because only a limited number of the
components of an ecosystem can be tested for in the laboratory, and
then only under a limited range of conditionsP Tests which use one
chemical compound at a time, over a limited range of concentrations,
may overlook important cumulative or synergistic effects. Other studies
may focus on a substance's effects on the mortality of an indicator
species at a single stage of its life,22 thereby neglecting both the sub-
lethal (chronic) and cumulative effects on that particular species, and
the potential effects on species of different trophic levels. Thus, for
example, the use of indicator species to provide both qualitative and
quantitative characterizations of ecosystem quality "may be an example
of over-emphasis on a criterion of legal relevance and statistical
precision over criteria of comprehensiveness and realism, in order to
satisfy requirements of the legal process." 23
no adverse effect. They note that such experiments focus on reducing the incidence of type I false
positive, errors but not type II, false negative, errors.
2 0 This controversy stems from scepticism of the high doses which are typically administered
and the high sample sizes that are required for proper testing. In contrast, see Toxic Substances
Strategy Committee, Toxic Chemicals and Public Protection: A Report to the President (Washington,
D.C: usopo, May 1980) at 125-33 [hereinafter Toxic Chemicals]. One of the conclusions of this
committee, which included eighteen United States federal agencies, was that "established test
protocols, which include administration of high test doses to animals, sometimes by a route different
than the expected human exposure route, are appropriate and scientifically valid test methods for
identifying human carcinogens," as cited in J.F. Castrilli & T. Vigod, Pesticides in Canada: An
Examination of Federal Law and Policy (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987) at 23.
21 See M.R. Gelpe & A.D. Tarlock, "The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking" (1975) 48 S.Cal. L. Rev. 371 at 403, for a complete discussion of the
methodological difficulties in extrapolating from laboratory data to natural ecosystems.
22 In Canada, for instance, testing requirements in the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations,
SOR/92-269, sch. I, written pursuant to the Fisheuies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, require that fish of a
species that frequents the waters into which effluent is being discharged should be used for toxicity
testing of mill effluent. Schedule I of the Regulations also designates rainbow trout and Daphnia
magna as the two indicator species to be used in assessing the toxicity of the effluent. The
assumption is that toxic responses in these species act as indicators for other species and whole
ecosystems. However, "species vary greatly in their tolerance to pollution, and most toxicity studies
use fairly pollution-tolerant species" as they are easier to maintain under stressful laboratory
conditions: See R.W. Howarth, "Determining the Ecological Effects of Oil Pollution in Marine
Ecosystems" in S.A. Levin et al., eds., Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches (New York-
Springer-Verlag, 1989) 69 at 71.
23 H.A. Regier, "Commentary" in Cumulative Environmental Effects: A BinationalPerspective
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1989) 49 at 50. Regier comments on the scientific
perspective on the cumulative environmental effects on freshwater systems, at a workshop held by
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council and the United States National
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The possibility of synergistic reactions among chemical
compounds in the environment creates additional hardships for decision
makers because they make predictions difficult. Some substances may
have insignificant toxic effects when analyzed individually but may be
significantly toxic when combined. One example of synergistic and
nonlinear interactions among chemicals involves the air pollutants
benzo(a)pyrene and benzo(a)anthrocene. Both are carcinogenic on
mouse skin, but their potency is increased one thousandfold in the
presence of n-dodecane which, by itself, is non-carcinogenic. 24 These
are all potential sources of type II errors.
2. Field studies
Field studies are also subject to inherent uncertainties. Natural
ecosystems exhibit such a high degree of complexity in structure and
function that they are difficult to study.25 Where there is more than one
pathway for the same function in a community, the potential effect of a
human disturbance that interferes with only one of these pathways may
be masked,26 while a later disturbance affecting remaining pathways may
have an observable effect-an effect which may be difficult to trace to its
source.27 Unfortunately, proper experimental design (such as the use of
"replicates," or duplications at different locations28) is often difficult to
Research Council Board on Basic Biology in Toronto, Ontario, 4-7 February 1985.
24 See "A Generic View,"supra note 6 at 221.
2 5 See Gelpe & Tarlocl4 supra note 21 at 396-407, for a discussion of the complexity of natural
ecosystems, threshold effects, and the difficulties of using laboratory and field studies to describe
these systems.
2 6 For example, a predator at the top of the food chain may have several sources of food.
When one source becomes extinct, because of some anthropogenic disturbance, there may be no
observed effects on the predator population. However, the resilience of the ecosystem to future
disturbances may have been weakened as there are now fewer prey species to support the predator.
Serious depletion of the predator population will result if the remaining prey species suffer
subsequent disturbances; for example, if they are overharvested. Another aspect of community
resilience that can mask cause-effect relationships is the phenomenon of threshold responses. For
example, in the hypothetical predator-prey relationship described above, the removal of a third prey
species may cause the predator population to crash when no responses were detectable after the
earlier removal of one or two prey species. This is because the third species became critical once
the first two were removed.
2 7 CS. Holling, "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems" (1973) 4 Annual Rev. of Eco.
and System. 1 at 5.
28 Replicates allow the scientist to control for variables that could affect responses to the
experimental treatments. For example, spatial replicates of different experimental treatments
(types of manipulations) allow the scientist to control for variables associated with the natural
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achieve where confounding effects (those that cannot be controlled for)
associated with other variables in the study ecosystem cannot be
eliminated. Type II errors thus occur frequently as a result of hidden
resilience in ecological community structures, time-lags, threshold
responses, synergistic effects, and the limited ability of researchers to
conduct well-designed field experiments and long-term studies.
3. Epidemiological studies
Epidemiological studies also may have low statistical power29 as
a result of several associated problems. For example, sample sizes are
usually low, and controlling external factors (such as exposure to toxins
other than the one being studied) may be difficult. A researcher may
not be able to make clear associations between exposure to a carcinogen
and health effects for a large cohort 0 of workers or residents because of
difficulties in determining exact exposure levels. Epidemiologists are
also restricted in their ability to perform follow-up studies and, hence, to
establish cause-effect relationships, because of the long latency periods
characteristic of most carcinogens. Studies usually require that a
researcher monitor the study group over a twenty- to thirty-year period.
During this time, it is not uncommon for many individuals to leave the
cohort,31 thus reducing the sample size of the affected population. Since
statistical power is directly related to sample size, this inevitably lowers
the power of the study and reduces the probability of detecting an effect.
In addition, there may be more than one causative agent for the
observed effect, creating difficulties in correlating observable health
effects With exposure to any given toxin.
In summary, intrinsic variability in natural ecosystems,
cumulative and synergistic effects, confounding factors, large inherent
uncertainty, and the prevalence of low statistical power in laboratory,
environment Without proper replicates it maybe impossible to distinguish responses to human
manipulation from natural variation in the study ecosystem.
29 T.A. Brennan, "Causal Chains and Statistical links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in
Hazardous-Substance Litigation" (1988) 73 Comell L Rev. 469 at 506, discusses the problems of
epidemiological studies in demonstrating statistically significant associations between certain
chemical carcinogens and clinical outcomes. See also PIL Schuck4Agent Orange on Triaf" Mass
Toxic Disasters in the Courts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 236, for a
discussion of the role of low power in epidemiological evidence in the Agent Orange trials.
30 A cohort is a group of individuals having a statistical factor in common in an
epidemiological, biological, or demographic study.
3 1 This may occur, for example, by death from other causes, migration to another geographical
area, or a change of employment that removes aworker from the source of exposure being studied.
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field, and epidemiological studies make it difficult to establish clearly
cause-effect relationships between certain substances or processes and
eventual environmental degradation and endangerment of public health.
These problems amplify the concern over the lack of recognition of type
II errors in science, policy, and the law. This concern is magnified when
one appreciates the potential costs of such errors.
C. The Costs of Uncertainty
Type I and type II errors impose a number of economic and
social costs. Regulatory false positives derived from type I errors lead a
regulatory agency to bear the unnecessary administrative and monitoring
costs of implementing and enforcing stricter environmental standards.
Industry must pay, both in monetary expenditures and loss of
competitiveness, to install unnecessary emission control devices or
secondary treatment facilities, especially where these have to be
retrofitted. In addition, jobs may be lost through the closure of plants
that are unable to adapt profitably.
Direct monetary costs of type I errors can be especially high in
the case of an entire industry within a large jurisdiction. In response to
stricter regulation of the pulp and paper industry, for example, a report
by the Council of Forest Industries (coFI) in British Columbia suggested
that the potential cost of installing technologies to meet one proposed
standard for the discharge of absorbable organic halogens (2.5 kg per
tonne of pulp) in all mills in the province would be one billion dollars,
with a stricter standard (1.5 kg) costing an additional six-hundred million
dollars..
2
In contrast, regulatory false negatives resulting from type II
errors may result in high monetary costs of a different and potentially
more serious type: environmental clean-up costs, loss of earnings and
jobs in other industries incidentally affected by pollution, and costs
associated with human health effects. Indeed, failing to regulate a
dangerous pollutant over a long period may lead to an irreversible
resource loss or a decline in environmental quality, as well as monetary
losses which could be much higher than the more specific costs of a type
I error. One example of a regulatory false negative was the incorrect
conclusion that organochlorines in pulp mill effluents posed no danger
to the marine environment and human health on Canada's west coast.
3 2 Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia, Sustainable Development and the B.C. Pulp
and Paper Industry (Vancouver. coF, 1990) at 26.
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However, in 1989, the federal Department of Health and Welfare closed
several fisheries for crab, prawn, and shrimp because of dioxin
contamination from pulp and paper mill effluents 33 The costs of the
error included the loss of revenues from commercial fisheries and
associated employment, and the accumulated human health effects of a
still unknown, but potentially large, magnitude. Indeed, when type II
errors permeate both pollution regulations and resource management
generally (for example, in the calculation of fisheries quotas), the costs
in declining ecosystem productivity and sustainability can be enormous
and irreversible.
With persistent toxic contaminants, type II errors may, in the
long run, be more costly than type I errors that would impose potentially
unnecessary clean technology. Of course, such comparisons are of a
hypothetical nature, and quantitative data on the relative costs of type I
and type II errors are usually not available. Nevertheless, some
qualitative comparisons are possible. The lengthy debate over the role of
cFcs in the destruction of the ozone layer, with all of its consequences,34
indicates the potential scale of this regulatory problem. Although
banned for use in aerosols in the United States in the early 1970s, the
emphasis on averting type I errors and the general lack of concern for
the seriousness of type II errors led to a continuous increase in the usage
of cFcs in a variety of products until the late 1980s. Even the adoption in
September 1987 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer"s (since signed by 46 countries) only committed
participating countries to a gradual, phased-in reduction and elimination
schedule, despite worldwide anxiety over the impact on the environment,
and the (as yet, unquantifiable) costs to human health and industry.
33 See M. Campbell, "7 BC Fisheries ordered closed after poisons found in shellfish" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 November 1989) Al; and "B.C. Fisheries Shut Down" (1989) 19:48
Ottawa Letter 382. (The Ottawa Letter is the newsletter of the federal Parliament.) For a
discussion of these closures, which were expanded on 29 November 1991, see M. Waldichuk,
"Dioxin Pollution near Pulpraills" (1990) 21 Marine Poll. Bull. 365.
34 See generally, F.S. Rowland, "Chlorofluorocarbons and the Depletion of Stratospheric
Ozone" (1989) 77 Amer. Sci. 36.
35 The Protocol was adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, held in
Montreal from 14 to 16 September 1987:26 LLM. 1544. The protocol is important as it represents
the first multi-level agreement to restrict the use of substances in order to prevent future
environmental damage. However, several authors have suggested that the reduction schemes are
inadequate because of broad concessions to potential signatories. See T.C Faries, "Clearing the
Air- An Examination of International Law on the Protection of the Ozone Layer" (1990) 28 Alta. L
Rev. 818; and L Elrifi, "Protection of the Ozone Layer. A Comment on the Montreal Protocol"
(1990) 35 McGill L.J. 415.
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This slow response reflects an important practical fact: decision makers
have difficulty in taking remedial action when new data expose a
problem in a well-established product or practice. When irreversible
damage has already occurred, corrective action is impossible; but even
when future damage can be prevented by remedial action, corporations
and labour groups-which would bear the costs of retrofitting-demand
that the government provide hard evidence of detrimental effects.
The costs of the two types of regulatory errors are often incurred
by different parties, and this too has a significant effect on regulatory
orientation. The costs of regulatory false positives are immediate and
are paid directly by industry and government. Though these costs may
be passed on to the consumer, they will still affect the industry's
competitiveness. The costs of false negatives, however, may result in
economic externalities, the costs of which are borne by other economic
sectors, the general public, and the environment. This phenomenon of
"diffuse costs and concentrated benefits" skews the process of decision
making because those most directly affected by stricter standards, i.e.,
industriil interests, have a clear and immediate interest in informing
government of the specific costs of actionP6 In contrast, those
representing the general environmental and public interest must
organize disparate groups and, even then, may only be able to point to
uncertain, long-term costs imposed unevenly on a diverse and, as yet,
unrepresented variety of future interests.
36 W.F. Sinclair, in "Controlling Effluent Discharges from Canadian Pulp and Paper
Manufacturers" (1991) 17:1 Can. Pub. Pol. 86 at 98-99, comments on the state of pulp and paper
regulation in Canada-
[Tihere is considerable incentive for government representatives to accept industry
claims of economic hardship in order to avoid the perceived risks associated with causing
economic and social dislocation. However, there are no incentives for industry to accept
government demands for reductions in effluent discharges unless environmental
authorities are prepared to reject the often exaggerated claims of economic hardship by
industty, and are willing to prosecute.
[VOL. 32 NO. 1
Environmental Decision Making
D. Conclusion: The Trade-off Between Certainty and Uncertainty
As noted briefly above, many studies dealing with environmental
and health issues suffer from low statistical power. As well, in any given
situation, a trade-off exists between the probabilities of making a type I
and type II error because of the inverse relationship between alpha and
beta values. Thus, a decision-making process which requires certainty
has a high probability of having undesired effects as a result of
uncertainty. This regulatory situation parallels the judicial context
where the use of the high standard of proof in a criminal prosecution
("beyond a reasonable doubt") makes it less likely that an innocent
person will be convicted (type I error) than if the lesser civil standard
("on the balance of probabilities") were applied. Inevitably, however,
the stricter standard of proof creates a greater probability of letting a
guilty person go unconvicted (type Il error) than if the lesser standard of
proof were used. This clear analogy between scientific research and
criminal prosecutions has meant that the regulation of hazardous
substances and activities generally occurs only when there is clear
evidence that a hazard actually exists. This is the basis of the regulatory
paradigm of "permissive regulation." Yet, as in criminal prosecutions,
such high standards in environmental regulation may be creating many
cases in which activities are not as restricted as they should be.
III. UNCERTAINTY AND CAUSATION IN CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Problems of identifying causal links in the face of uncertainty are
increasingly pervasive in environmental and legal matters today. For
example, the statistical/legal analysis presented here is relevant to the
impact of acid rain on forests; to the impact of fishing on declining fish
populations; to co 2 and cFc emissions and their effect on the
atmosphere; and to the effect of clearcutting on wildlife populations and
biological diversity. However, we are concerned with only one aspect of
this larger group of problems: the regulation of environmental pollution.
The concepts of "burden" and "standard" of proof are the legal
complements to scientific procedures for evaluating uncertainty. The
burden of proof refers to the responsibility to adduce evidence before a
fact finder in order to establish a particular hypothesis. This includes
both a primary burden of ultimate persuasion, and a secondary burden
1994]
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(the so-called evidentiary burden3 7) to adduce evidence on any specific
fact in issue. While the primary burden is fixed in both civil and criminal
proceedings, the secondary burden alternates between the defendant
and the plaintiff/prosecution throughout any trial, civil or criminal,
according to who is less likely to meet that burden with regard to any
particular fact in issue. The standard of proof refers to the strength of
the evidence which must be adduced to establish a particular hypothesis.
Civil cases are decided on a balance of probabilities; in criminal cases,
the stricter standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is applied. As
discussed below, the permissive character of Canada's environmental
regulatory system is evident in the traditional allocation of the burden of
proof, and in the standard of proof applied in both the common law and
statutory regulation.
A. Proof of Harm Under the Common Law
Private citizens may have recourse to a number of common law
causes of action to protect both their own private interests and,
indirectly, those of the environment. These include the torts of private
and public nuisance, riparian rights, trespass, negligence, and strict
liability. Of all the causes of action, however, only a public nuisance
action might lead to a remedy for environmental damageper se (usually
through the intervention of the Attorney General38 ), as all the other
causes of action require the plaintiff to establish that a personal,
proprietary interest has been affected. In such civil actions, the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to show that, on a balance of probabilities,
health and/or private property has suffered as a result of the defendant's
actions. Environmental protection through the common law occurs as a
by-product of such civil actions. The plaintiff may seek compensation by
way of damages or may ask the court to grant an injunction to prevent a
potential, or ongoing, wrong. Thus, the common law achieves
3 7 R. Cross, Evidence, 5th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at 87, defines the evidentiary
burden of proof as "the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence
to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being had to the
standard of proof demanded of the party under such obligation." The Law Reform Commission of
Canada noted that the burden of producing evidence refers to the responsibility a party has to
produce some evidence of an asserted fact to avoid a ruling by the judge that the existence of the
fact cannot be considered. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Burdens of Proof and Presumptions
(Study No. 8) by the Law of Evidence Project (Ottawa: July 1973) at 43-67.
3 8 For the "public interest" exception whereby a private complainant may be granted standing,
see MinisterFinance of Canada v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607.
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environmental protection either by granting an injunction to deter the
defendant from allowing the wrong to continue or by requiring payment,
both of which act as deterrents to others who may undertake similar
actions 39
Important differences between various causes of action exist.
For example, in a private nuisance action, proving that an action had a
certain detrimental effect may not be enough to establish the
defendant's liability, as the "social utility of the conduct complained of
must be weighed against the significance of the injury caused and the
value of the interest sought to be protected."40 Of special concern,
however, is the problem of establishing a causal link between the
defendant's activity and the probable environmental harm to the
plaintiff. Proving this connection is especially problematic where relief
is sought before the consequences manifest themselves. 41 Here, too,
important differences exist between various causes of action. For
example, while an action in trespass is often pleaded in conjunction with
an action in nuisance, once a trespass has been established, the harm is
prima facie wrongful, and the defendant is obliged to prove justification
or excuser This effective reversal of the onus has found expression in
the case of Cook v. Lewis/ 3 where the plaintiff was struck by birdshot
immediately after the two defendants discharged their guns. The jury
concluded that the plaintiff was struck by a shot fired by one of the two
defendants, but was unable to determine which one. The Court
concluded that, once the culpability of one of the two defendants had
been established,
39 The difficulties of getting an injunction are legion. For a summary of the applicable
principles, see I-lipwell v. Virden (Town of), [19871 47 M.R. 25 at 33 [hereinafter Hipwell]. For a
general survey of the state of the law, see E.J. Swanson, "The Common Law: New Developments
and Future Trends" in D. Tmgley, ed., Into the Future: Environmental Law and Policy for the 1990's
(Edmonton: Environmental Law Centre, 1990) at 79.
40 RoyalAnne Hotel v. Ashcroft, [1979] 2 W.W.R. 462 at 467-68 (B.C.CA.), McIntyre J.A.
41 In Waste Not Wanted Inc. v. 1. (1987), 2 C.EJLR. 24 at 48 (N.S.) [hereinafter Waste Not
Wanted Inc.], Collier . stated that the "legal test is whether the plaintiff has shown that it is
reasonably likely a failure, causing harm to occupiers, will occur. It is not for the defendants to
show, with certainty, that failure, and the possible consequences foreseen by Mr. Brown, will not
occur." See also Cantwell v. Minister of the Environment (1991), 6 C.E.L.R. 16 (N.S.), a case
concerning the proposed Point Aconi thermal plant in Nova Scotia. In that case, MacKay 3.
concluded that concern about co 2 does not in itself determine that the emission has any potentially
hannful effects.
42 A. Linden, Canadian TortLaw, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 247.
43 [1951] S.C.R. 830 [hereinafter Cook].
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the onus is then shifted to the wrongdoer to exculpate himself ... The onus attaches to
culpability, and if both acts bear that taint, the onus or prima fade transmission of
responsibility attaches to both, and the question of the sole responsibility of one is a
matter between them.4 4
As discussed below, if more broadly applied, this principle could have
important implications for the judicial reform of the common law.
More generally, however, merely establishing causation has
proven to be a significant obstacle to success. For example, with regard
to an action in negligence, not only must it be established that the
plaintiffs damage was caused by the conduct of the defendant, the
conduct of the defendant "must [also] be a proximate cause of the loss,
or stated in another way, the damage should not be too remote a result
of the defendant's conduct." Further, the plaintiff "must not be guilty of
contributory negligence."45 This raises the need to overcome the host of
scientific problems discussed in the previous section.
These difficulties in establishing a causal link between the
defendant's activity and probable environmental harm are best
illustrated by the case of Palmer v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries.46 In this
case, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' application for an injunction to
stop the defendant from spraying herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, which
contain dioxins, over their lands. A major difficulty in establishing a
causal link between the application of the herbicides and the adverse
health effects was the time-lag in the manifestation of effects,4 7 even
though a large volume of scientific evidence and expert testimony was
submitted to the Court, demonstrating that cancer and other adverse
health effects could be caused by even a small amount of dioxin. In
finding against the plaintiffs, the Court clearly affirmed that the
"complete burden of proof, of course, rests upon the plaintiffs
throughout for all issues asserted by them,"48 especially with respect to
prospective damage. With regard to the scientific evidence, Nunn J.
noted that "there are opposing views, and [that] the whole field is not
without some uncertainty," concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to
meet the burden of proof because the evidence did "not even come close
to establishing any probability ... of risk to health to warrant the granting
44 bi& at833.
4 5 linden, supra note 42 at 89.
46 (1983), 60 N.S.R. (2d) 271 [hereinafterPahner].
4 7 Ibid at 29& Dr. S. Daum, an expert witness for the plaintiffs, testified that "one difficulty in
making any assessment [regarding the carcinogenicity of dioxin in the herbicide] is the latency
period which, on average, is 20 years and may extend to 40 or even 50 years."
4 8 /bid. at 347.
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of quia timet injunctive relief."49 Nunn J. found that safe exposure levels
to carcinogens can be determined, and that positive test findings of
cancer in animals cannot be generalized to humans because of the high
doses administered to these animals.50
Above all, the Court's analysis reflects the scientific orientation
discussed above by its exclusive concern to avoid making the type I error
of incorrectly ascribing a causal relationship where one might not exist.
At no time did either counsel or Judge Nunn investigate the statistical
power of the expert studies presented that failed to show any adverse
effect of dioxins. Instead, accepting the allocation of the burden of
proof on the plaintiff, the Court merely restated the prevailing judicial
attitude that "if science itself is not certain, a court cannot resolve the
conflict and make the thing certain."51
Strict liability in the common law removes some of the
difficulties in proving causation by requiring the plaintiff only to
establish the actus reus, and not the negligence of the defendant.
Despite the earlier focus of strict liability on cases of non-natural uses of
land, in Cruise v. Niessen52 .(a case involving aerial spraying of
pesticides), the rule was applied to ordinary or common practices which
involve inherently dangerous substances. When the pesticide is shown to
have escaped from the property of the defendant on to that of the
plaintiff (the actus reus is established), the burden shifts to the defendant
to establish a defence for his actions. Strict liability thus facilitates
establishing a causal link but, as discussed below, serious obstacles
prevent this cause of action from developing very far under present
Canadian law.
4 9 Ibid. at 350-51. In contrast, Castrilli & Vigod, supra note 20 at 23 have criticized the
decision because "a number of conclusions made by the Court appear to run counter to principles
that have been widely supported in the scientific community, expert committees and international
agencies." This reasoning was, however, affirmed in the 1987 Ontario case of Waste Not Wanted
Inc., supra note 41, and in the 1987 Manitoba case of -ipwell, supra note 39.
5 0 Pabner, supra note 46 at 352. Both of these conclusions are contradicted in a 1980 Report
to the President by eighteen United States federal agencies. See Toxic Chemicals, supra note 20 and
accompanying text on laboratory studies.
5 1 Palmer, supra note 46 at 348. See, however, Farrell v. Snell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafter
Farrell], where the defendant in a malpractice suit was required to adduce evidence to rebut an
inference of negligence drawn from the plaintiffs evidence, even though the burden of proof
remained with the plaintiff. This case, however, differs from the Palmer decision in that visible
harm had occurred, and the only issue was the attribution of blame.
52 [1978] 1 W.W.R. 688.
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B. Proof of Environmental Harm in Statutory Law
Regulation of environmental pollution in Canada involves
literally hundreds of federal and provincial statutes. A comprehensive
review of these statutes is beyond the scope of this section, which focuses
on the character of the regulatory process that permeates a range of
federal and provincial statutes.
The primary federal statutes involved in the control of
environmental, especially toxic, pollution are the Fisheries Act,53 the
Canada Water Act,5 4 the Pest Control Products Act,55 the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act,5 6 and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 57 which
replaces the Environmental Contaminants Act,5 8 the Ocean Dumping
Control Act,59 the Clean Air Act,60 and Part III of the Canada Water
Act. 61 The Fisheries Act has long been the government's major
instrument for protecting water quality by regulating the discharge of
53 Supra note 22.
54 R.S.C. 1985, Q C-ll.
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9. This Act provides for banning the use, production, or import of
particular substances, as does the Food and DnugsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, and the Atomic Energy
ControlAct, R.S.C 1985, c. A-16.
56 P.S.C. 1985, c. M-10. Vehicle emission standards are set under this Act.
57 S.C. 1988, c. 22 [hereinafter CEPA].
5 8 R.S.C 1985, c. E-12, now repealed. ThisAct was the primaty federal legislation throughout
the 1980s regulating specific classes of toxic substances. See ChlorobiphenylRegulations, No.1,
C.R.C. 1978, c. 564; Chlorofluorocarbons Regulations, COR/80-254; Mrex Regulations, SOR/78-891;
Polybrominated Biphenyls Regulations, SOR/79-351; and Polychlorinated Terphenyls Regulations,
SOR/79-369. These are now all regulated under Schedule I of the CEPA
5 9 R.S.C 1985, c. 0-2, now repealed.
60 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47, now repealed. ThisAct set out unenforceable emission guidelines for
a variety of industries including mining, asphalt paving, cement manufacturing, incinerators,
thermal power plants, wood pulping, and so on. Several sets of regulations to protect human health
were also promulgated which are now administered under the CEPA. These include Asbestos
Mining and Milling National Emission Standards Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 405; Chlor-Alkall
Mercury National Emission Standards Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 406; Secondary Lead Smelter
National Emission Standards Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 412; and Vinyl Chloride National Emilson
Standards Regulations, SOR/79-299.
61 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-11. While this Act allows the government to focus on maintaining water
quality objectives through designations of water quality management areas (ss. 4, 5, and 11), it has
not yet made any such designations.
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miscellaneous "deleterious substances" by specific industrial sectors.62
This Act allows the Minister of Environment to require modifications of
plans for new operations which might lead to regulatory violations.6a
The statutory regulation of toxic substances at both the federal
and provincial levels imposes onerous legal and non-legal burdens. Even
before regulatory action is initiated, many federal statutes place an
onerous non-legal burden on the government agency. For example, the
Canadian federal Environmental Contaminants Act64 mandated anyone
importing or manufacturing a chemical compound for the first time to
disclose information regarding the danger which it might pose to human
health or the environment. However, in order for such information to
be required, the substance had to be included on the Schedule of
Prescribed Substances, which itself required the government agencies to
believe that a substance was entering or will enter the environment "in a
quantity or concentration or under conditions that they have reason to
believe constitute or will constitute a significant danger to human health
or the environment." 65 In essence, someone had to demonstrate with
statistically significant experimental data that an effect was likely to exist.
This was such a difficult task (as we have seen) that the agency never
invoked section 4(1)(c) of the Act and, thus, never imposed systematic
testing requirements.66
The CEPA was passed with much fanfare by the federal
government as a vehicle both to monitor and control toxic substances
and to bring miscellaneous related statutory functions under one
comprehensive statute to allow the government to shape industrial
practices affecting environmental quality. The CEPA provides for a
tiered approach to the classification and regulation of toxic substances.
At the first stage, in consultation with provincial governments,
representatives of labour and industrial sectors, and associations
concerned with environmental and health matters, the Ministers compile
a Priority Substances List, specifying substances "in respect of which the
62 See Chlor-alkali Mercury Liquid Effluent Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 811; Metal Mining
Liquid Effluent Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 819; Petroleum Refinery Liquid Effluent Regulations,
C.R.C. 1978, c. 828; Potato Processing Plant Liquid Effluent Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 829; and
Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations, SOR/92-269.
63 FisherierAct, supra note 22, s. 27(2).
64 1974-75-76, c. 72 [hereinafter EC4], s. 4(6). ThisActwas repealed in 1988 by s. 147 of the
CEPA
65 EC, ibid s. 4(1).
6 6 E.W. Keyserling, CrinesAgainst the Environment (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1985) at 41, note 32.
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Ministers are satisfied priority should be given in assessing whether they
are toxic or capable of becoming toxiC."67 The second stage is to assess
the toxicity of these substances through a process of data collection.P If
the Minister decides that the substance meets the requirements for
designation as a toxic substance, as outlined in the definition of a toxic
substance,6 9 it is added to the List of Toxic Substances. 70 After that,
regulations may be written 7 at the discretion of the Minister. 72
Throughout this process, the burden still remains squarely on the
government to establish that a particular substance warrants regulation
before regulations will be implemented. However, a major change in the
CEPA over the ECA is the inclusion of the word "may" in the definition
of toxic substances in the CEPA. This wording suggests that the
evidence required to show toxicity does not necessarily have to satisfy
rigorous conditions of certainty. Section 11 of the CEPA states that
a substance is toxic if it is entering or may enter the environment in a quantity or
concentration
(a) having or that may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the
environment;
(b) constituting or that may constitute a danger to the environment on which human life
depends; or
(c) constituting or that may constitute a danger in Canada to human life. [emphasis
added]
By recognizing the existence of scientific uncertainty, the CEPA allows
the Minister more freedom to make cautious decisions than was
6 7 CEPA, supra note 57, s. 12.
68 kid. s. 15. Section 15 details the process of collecting data and conducting investigations
respecting the nature of the substance; its presence in the environment and its effect on the
environment or on human life or health; its potential for dispersal and persistence; its ability to
bioaccumulate; methods of controlling the presence of the substance in the environment; methods
of testing for its presence, development, and use of alternatives to the substances; quantities, uses,
and disposal of the substance; and methods of reducing the amount used, produced, or released into
the environment.
69Iid. s. 11.
70 ibAdU s. 33. The Governor in Council must be "satisfied that a substance is toxic on the
recommendation of the Ministers."
71IbUt s.34.
72 With regard to those substances that were included on the Priority Substance List in
February 1989, the Department of the Environment (C. Gaz. 1989.1.544) stated that
each substance that has been selected ... will undergo an assessment of whether or not it
is "toxic" and it should not be assumed that regulations will be required for each
substance merely because it has been selected for investigation ... If a substance is
determined to be "toxic," the Ministers will indicate their intentions with regard to
recommending regulations.
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available under the ECA. The Minister can thus add a substance to the
List of Toxic Substances and write regulations, even if there is some
uncertainty as to the extent of harm that may be caused. The risk of
making a type II error can thus be reduced. Despite the less restrictive
definition of a toxic substance, however, few regulations have been
passed under the CEPA. Whether the potentially preventative approach
in the Act will actually be translated into regulations remains an open
question.7
3
Creation of regulations is only one step in the process. When
one tries to enforce these regulations similar problems of scientific
uncertainty and causation recur. Canadian environmental legislation
classifies most pollution offences as quasi-criminal, regulatory offences.
In theory, prosecution of the regulatory offence does not require the
Crown to show that the accused intentionally caused or allowed
pollution to occur, only that a certain limit has been exceeded, and that
the accused was responsible.74 The standard of proof required to
discipline polluters should, therefore, be eased. In practice, however,
this is often not the case.
In the Canadian regulatory system, guidelines and objectives
(rather than legally enforceable standards) are commonly used. Thus,
one cannot merely show that the limits have been exceeded, but that the
discharge has violated some statutory definition of "pollution." As
recently noted in a paper for the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
the result in such situations is that the "difference between conviction
and acquittal in pollution prosecutions is often the Crown's ability (or
lack thereof) to prove that a deposit or emission qualifies as pollution as
defined in legislation or regulations." 75
But such problems apply more broadly, as an examination of the
practice under the federal Fisheries Act reveals. One of the most
73 In fact, in August 1988, the Priority Substance Advisory Panel recommended that fifty
substances, or groups of substances, be included on the Priority Substance List. The forty-four
substances that were actually listed (C. Gaz. 1989.L545) were divided into three groups according to
the planned completion of assessment reports. Only nine substances were included in Group I of
that list, those requiring the most immediate action. Assessment was scheduled to be completed by
the end of 1992, but as of June 1993, only ten of the substances on the list had been assessed. The
only regulations for substances on the list are for Pulp and Paper Mdl Effluent Chlorinated Dioxins
and Furans (SOR/92-267) and for the related Pulp and Paper Mill Defoamer and Wood Chips
(SOR/92-268). In addition, the use of the word "may" in American statutes has led to a variety of
judicial interpretations. See Flournoy, supra note 6 at 341-44.
74 K. Webb, Pollution Control in Canada: The Regulatory Approach in the 1980s (Ottawa: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1988) at 34-39.
75 bid at 39. Webb's examples are primarily drawn from the FisheriesAct.
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influential pieces of legislation for environmental protection in Canada,
section 36(3) of the Act, contains a blanket prohibition against "the
deposit of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by
fish." This section has been used widely to prevent environmental
degradation. However, sections 36(4) and 36(5) of the Act set
prescribed levels for specific pollutants. Although they seem to give
greater precision and efficacy to the regulatory process, in practice, these
provisions counterbalance, and potentially diminish, the strength of the
broader prohibition by shifting from prevention of environmental harm
topermission for some prescribed quantity of industrial discharges.
There have certainly been numerous convictions under the
Fisheries Act, but the permissive regulatory structure of offences has
created an onerous evidentiary burden for prosecutors. Essentially, the
prosecution must establish four elements of the offence contained in
section 36(3) of theAct: (1) that the accused person or corporation was
responsible for the deposit, (2) that a deposit occurred, (3) that the
deposit was a deleterious substance, and (4) that it was deposited into
waters frequented by fish.76 In R. v. Irving Pulp and Paper Ltd. (No. 1),77
the accused was charged with depositing a deleterious substance, pulp
mill waste, into the Saint John River. The specific testing procedure for
determining toxicity, prescribed in Schedule D of the Pulp and Paper
Effluent Regulations, was not followed by government authorities.
Instead, a newer procedure was used, and these test results were
introduced into evidence. This resulted in acquittal on the basis that,
even though the substance discharged was generally considered to be
deleterious for the purposes of the Act, the testing procedures used did
not satisfy the requirements of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations.78
In a later appellate level case, R. v. Doman Forest Products,79 the Court
held that although the levels of the chemical were considered lethal to
trout and extremely toxic to salmon in minute quantities, the trial judge
still had doubts regarding deleteriousness because no witness had said
7 6 See A.R. Thompson & H. Rueggeberg, "Science, Inference and the Law: The Ultimate
Fish Story" in CD. Levings, L.B. Holtby & M.A. Henderson, eds., Proceedings of the National
Workshop on Effects of Habitat Alteration on Salmonid Stocks, Canadian Special Publication of
Fisheries andAquatic Sciences 105 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1989) at 167.
77 (1976), 2 F.P.R. 78 (N.B. Prov. CL) [hereinafterliving (No. 1)].
78 .1bid at 81.
79 (1982), 3 F.P.R. 326. This appeal was dismissed in light of a possible alternative
explanation "for the presence of chemical and pH levels at various stages throughout the discharge
system" (327-28) and because of the absence of sufficient evidence at trial.
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"at what level the liquid became deleterious."80 Thus, the trial judge
"had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the concentration of the
chemical in the liquid pumped out of the sump was deleterious to
fish,"81 and the Crown appeal was dismissed.
As these and other cases8 2 demonstrate, many actions brought
under section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act have been frustrated by the
technical requirements of establishing the "deleteriousness" of a
substance; that is, that there was a causal link between the polluting
activity and the alleged harm. Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" that a
substance is deleterious is difficult to establish, however, when there is
no documented evidence of fish kills or actual impairment of fish
habitats. Without this evidence, the prosecution must rely on other sub-
lethal indices of harm. As we have seen, this allows some doubt as to the
link between the discharge and the harm to the fish.83
The regulatory process under the federal Fisheries Act thus
requires that the Crown establish the essential elements of a "pollution"
offence rather than the simple fact that the accused was not in
compliance with regulatory standards. Even where such pollution is also
provincially regulated by a system of waste discharge permits, which
implement federal standards, a discharge that does not comply with
provincial permit conditions is not, according to the Fisheries Act,
automatically regarded as deleterious to the protected resource. Thus,
Canadian federal legislation, as it is currently applied, does little to
recognize the great uncertainties inherent in scientific environmental
and health research. With the enormous difficulties in meeting the legal
standard and burden of proof, we may be committing numerous type II
errors without yet realizing it.
Provincial regulation of pollution offences through the
enforcement of permit conditions face similar problems. For example,
the British Columbia Waste Management Act,84 section 3(2), states that
80 Iid. at 327.
81 Ibi at 328.
82 See, for example, the conflicting decisions of R. v. Imperial Oil Enterprises LtL (1978), 2
F.P.R. 155 (N.S. Mag. Ct.); and R. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Alberni) Limited (1979), 2 F.P.R. 182
(B.C.C.A.).
83 The testing procedures for toxicity, upon which decisions of deleteriousness are most often
based, usually do not recognize that a substance can be deleterious without having acute toxic
effects. Chronic and sub-lethal effects, such as impaired reproductive ability or reduced life
expectancy, often are not considered sufficient evidence of deleteriousness. See Webb, supra note
74 at 40.
8 4 SB.C. 1982, c. 41.
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"no person shall introduce waste into the environment in such a manner
or quantity as to cause pollution," but then allows, in section 3(3), "the
disposition of waste in compliance with a permit, approval, order or the
regulations, or with a waste management plan approved by the
minister." These sections reflect the permissive regulatory approach at
the provincial level, a standard pattern across the country. Waste
disposal is defined as a strict liability offence 5 under the Act,86 but the
permissive nature of provincial legislation again demands proof that a
discharge fits the statutory definition of "waste" and that the accused, in
allowing the discharge, was not in compliance with permit conditions.
As at the federal level, prosecution of an offence under section 3 of
B.C.'s Act is subject to strict requirements to establish causation;
requirements which can significantly impede successful litigation.87
The Ontario case of Re Canada Metal Company Ltd. and
Macfarlane88 provides a good example of the difficulties into which these
legal restrictions lead. In that case, stop orders issued by the Director of
the Ontario Ministry of the Environment under the Environmental
Protection Act89 were quashed by the Ontario Supreme Court, because
the Ministry could not satisfactorily demonstrate a causal link between
lead emissions from the two accused firms and the incidence of high lead
blood levels in the surrounding area. An affidavit of the Director of the
Air Management Branch cited an engineer's report that "levels of [lead
were] considerably in excess of those found in normal urban
environments." This evidence was later dismissed by the Court on the
basis that the words "considerably in excess of those found in a normal
urban environment" had no evidentiary value since, "there [was] no
evidence as to what the lead levels [were] in a normal environment, let
85 Strict liability offences, in a criminal law context, result in criminal liability without the
necessity of proving that the accused intended to commit the wrongful act. Therefore, the Crown
need only prove the elements of the offence, at which time the onus shifts to the accused to
establish either that the offence occurred without its consent, knowledge or acquiescence, or that
there was due diligence. In a tort context, fault by the defendant need not be established.
86tSupra note 84 at s. 5.3. The section is subject to strict requirements of proof, including inter
alia a determination that the substance is "waste," and that the waste constituted "pollution" in the
manner and quantity in which it was introduced to the environment
8 7 Interview with Frances Gordon, British Columbia Crown Prosecutor (8 October 1990)
Vancouver, British Columbia.
88 (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 577 (Oat. H.C.).
89 R.S.O. 1990, c. E-19. Section 8(1) allows such orders where there are "reasonable and
probable grounds . that a source of contamination is discharging into the natural environment any
contaminant that constitutes ... an immediate danger to human life [and] health."
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alone what the deponent in his own mind regard[ed] as a normal urban
environment."90
Contrary to this general pattern, the federal Pest Control
Products Act9l attempts a more preventative approach, reducing the risk
of type II errors by requiring an industry to show that the products it
proposes to market or use are safe before they may be registered and
marketed. 92 As the Minister who introduced the original Bill noted in
the House, the increased use of, and the great concern over, the
potentially harmful pesticides called for "a broader authority for
regulation than in the past."93 The regulations written pursuant to the
Act state that, in the Minister's "opinion," the use of the pesticide must
not "lead to an unacceptable risk of harm ... to public health, plants,
animals or the environment."9
However, in effect, the Act defines as "safe" anything that has
not been demonstrated as constituting an "unacceptable risk of harm,"
which is not itself defined in the Act or regulations. Furthermore, in
assessing this risk of harm, theAct does not specify any improvement in
standard testing procedures, which do not presently require the
reporting of a study's statistical power when results fail to reject the null
hypothesis. Under the Act, "absolute safety is not what must be shown,
or indeed is being shown by applicants."95 Instead, the standard of proof
applied when demonstrating safety is more oriented to providing the
decision maker with a risk-benefit calculation; that is, the expected risks
of using the chemicals are measured against the expected benefits.9
This risk-based, reversed standard for industries to get approval of
pesticide applications is less stringent than the traditional standard
90 Supra note 88 at 589.
91 tS.C. 1985, c P-9.
92 Sections 6(i) and 9(2)(a)(i) to (xi) of the Pest Control Products Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c.
1253, require the applicant to provide the Minister with scientific test studies and results regarding:
control product effectiveness; occupational safety and exposure; effects on host plant, animal,
article, or non-target organism; control product and residue persistence, retention, and movement;
analysis methods for detecting the control product and its residues; detoxification or neutralization
methods; disposal methods; and information regarding the storage, display, stability, and
compatibility of the product with other products.
93 The Honourable HA. Olson, in House of Commons Debates (14 January 1969) at 4275, as
quoted in Castrilli & Vigod, supra note 20 at 42.
9 4 Pest Control Products Regulations, supra note 92, para. 18(d)(ii).
95 Castrlli & Vigod, supra note 20 at 53.
96 See generally, "A Generic View," supra note 6 for a discussion of risk-benefit analysis in the
context of the regulation of toxic substances. See also, "A Framework," supra note 6, which
considers the regulatory framework for such an evaluation.
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imposed on agencies which are prosecuting offences. In the former case,
actual safety need not be shown whereas, in the latter case, actual harm
must be shown "beyond a reasonable doubt," and with no balancing of
risks and benefits. While the general approach of theAct is thus more
preventative than that of other legislation, the test used to determine
"safety" fails to account adequately for scientific uncertainty-to the
benefit of greater industrial freedom of action. This increases the risk of
making type II errors, which could lead to harm.
The problem evidenced by the Pest Control Products Act is not an
easy one to overcome .so long as regulators are still ultimately required
to make a determination of the "risk of harm" for particular substances
entering the surrounding environment. Whether it is the Environmental
Contaminants Act, the Fisheries Act, the B.C. Waste Management Act, or
other legislation, the pattern is the same. Furthermore, the calculations
of damage to the environment are usually very limited in scope. Even
the CEPA and the regulations presently being drafted under it
demonstrate a continuing "inability to look beyond the end of an
effluent pipe to the surrounding ecosystem."97 Another critic of the new
CEPA regulations for dioxins and furans commented that "[a]ttempting
to control the deposition of a deleterious substance simply by setting a
limit on its concentration in an effluent pipe [rather than the total
amount being discharged] is meaningless from an ecological standpoint,
and scientifically unjustifiable. s9 8 In other words, what is important is
how much is being discharged, the resultant concentration levels in
various parts of the environment, and the overall results. In short, as
Muldoon and Valiante concluded in their study of toxic water pollution
in Canada, new preventative approaches are developing internationally,
but
[dlespite [the] CEPA, much of the existing regime with respect to federal environmental
pollution control remains unmodified or only slightly modified...
9 7 J.B. Sprague, "Comments on Proposed Federal Regulations for Control of Water Pollution
From Pulp and Paper Mills" (1B. Sprague Associates, 1990) at 2. Sprague is a noted toxicologist
and co-author of the Municipal and Industrial Strategy of Abatement (MmSA) report on pulp and
paper mill pollution. See Expert Committee on Kraft Mill Toxicity, "Stopping Water Pollution at
Its Source: Kraft Mill Effluents in Ontario" by N. Bonsor, N. McCubbin & J.B. Sprague (Toronto:
Pulp and Paper Sector of MISA, Ontario Ministry of the Environment, April 1988).
98 Rawson Academy of Aquatic Sciences, Briefing Document on the Proposed Federal
Regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act dealing with Dioxin and Furan
Discharges from Pulp and Paper Mlls (Ottawa: 1990) at 7.
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Instead, the existing emphasis on attempting to find ways and means of dealing with
wastes already created seems well entrenched.
9 9
IV. PERMISSIVE REGULATION: THE PARADIGM IN CRISIS
Underlying the legislation and common law described above is a
way of thinking about the control of toxic pollution that is largely taken
for granted. This is the "paradigm" of permissive regulation, which
permits discharges into, or activities in, a receiving environment, some of
which may occur only to a specified limit which purportedly reflects
"safe" levels. The problems associated with the paradigm are evident in
the common but ill-considered and incorrect assumptions about how the
environment assimilates waste, how scientific research is done, how
reliable the results of such research are, and how regulatory agencies
operate. These problems undermine the paradigm on both theoretical
and practical levels, and lead to growing criticism of permissive
regulation worldwide. Though increasingly voiced in Canada, these
criticisms point to the need for a new theory of regulation and a new
practical approach to the implementation of controls.
A. The Assumption of Assimilative Capacity
The permissive regulation paradigm is based on the philosophy
of what might be called the "assimilative capacity" theory of pollution
control. Under this theory, "allowable" levels of polluting behaviours, or
levels of discharge into the receiving environment, are permitted in
accordance with the central assumption that the environment has an
enduring capacity to assimilate these prescribed levels of pollutants
without harm. With the increasing experience of the environmental
"surprises" 100 referred to above, this approach has, in recent years, come
under mounting international criticism by governments,
non-governmental organizations, and international regulatory bodies.
In a 1986 report on hazardous waste reduction, the United States
Office of Technology Assessment (usoTA) outlined a basic criticism of
the assimilative capacity approach that has been independently taken up
by many others:
9 9 Supra note 7 at 33 and 78.
100 See C.S. Holling, "The resilience of terrestrial ecosystems: local surprise and global
change" in W.C. Clark & R.E. Munn, eds., Sustainable Development of the Biosphere (New York:
University of Cambridge Press, 1986) 292.
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American environmental protection efforts emphasize control and cleanup of pollution
by hazardous substances after they are generated and no longer serve a productive
function ... The cost of controlling that waste totals many billions of dollars annually.
Usually, hazardous industrial wastes are not destroyed by pollution control methods.
Rather, they are put into the land, water, or air where they disperse and migrate. The
result is that pollution control for one environmental medium can mean that waste is
transferred to another medium. [This] regulatory system sanctions the generation of
certain amounts of waste, and these can accumulate to environmentally unacceptable
levels when postpollution control discharges from many generators enter the
environment. 1 01 [emphasis added]
Muldoon and Valiante have made a similar critique in the Canadian
context and point to five structural changes needed in the regulatory
framework. These changes require the shift from: (1) a medium-specific
to cross-media approach, (2) a waste-management to a reduction-of-
toxic-use-at-the-source approach, (3) a focus on allowable
concentrations to one on absolute load reductions, (4) point-source to
non-point-source pollution control, and (5) inter-jurisdictional
regulation to an ecosystem approach.1 02
B. The Assumption of Scientfc Knowledge
Underlying the assumption of assimilative capacity is a
corresponding assumption that we are, in some way, basing our
regulations and allowable limits on firm scientific knowledge. It is not
necessary to review in detail the statistical and research problems
discussed above, but it is useful here to consider how these problems
restrict our ability to actually protect environmental quality on a
scientific basis. Indeed, the range of problems are so great that the very
character of the regulatory process as "scientific" must be called into
question.
First, is the sheer scale of the regulatory problem. There are
presently some 30,000 to 45,000 industrial emissions and effluents that
remain unassessed with regard to toxicity, and between 500 and 1,000
new chemicals that are introduced each year.103 When regulation occurs
on a substance-by-substance basis (as is common with the current
permissive approach), a huge diversity of chemicals necessarily escapes
regulation, including a large number of new substances introduced
101 "Serious Reduction of Hazardous Waste: For Pollution Prevention and Industrial
Efficiency" (Washington, D.C.: USOTA, 1986) at 11 (Summary) and 29.
102 Supra note 7.
103 (1989) 19:8 Ottawa Letter 56.
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annually. This is so, at least partly, because the amount of testing
required to determine whether a chemical is dangerous enough to
regulate is prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. 04
In addition to the huge number of chemicals in use, it is difficult
to set criteria for determining which of those substances require priority
action. The generally accepted criteria are toxicity, persistence, and
bioaccumulation. However, because of the concerns discussed earlier,
these are rendered quite subjective as guides to identifying what to
regulate and what thresholds of harm should be set.
Testing has historically focused on acute toxicity, rather than on
sub-lethal, chronic, or cumulative effects, so that the database of
scientific knowledge in the latter areas is extremely limited. Yet, as one
critic noted in relation to Canadian regulations under the CEPA, for
many highly toxic substances, "it is their chronic effects and their
potential to cause severe damage over the longer term at sub-lethal
levels of exposure that is cause for concern and serious regulatory
prohibitions. ' S At the final stages of the regulatory process, without
such data on regulated substances, prosecutors trying to establish
environmental damage must rely on the testimony of toxicological and
epidemiological expert witnesses, whose testimony is based on a variety
of scientific studies. Unfortunately, these studies deal with "issues of
causality in terms of statistical probabilities [and] [t]raditionally, the
courts have been reluctant to accept probabilistic evidence as showing
causation." 06
It is in this realm of hidden relationships that surprising results
are so often experienced, given the temporal and spatial latencies
associated with so many cause-effect relationships. For example, in the
case of carcinogenesis, the latency period between exposure to a
cancer-causing substance and the appearance of a tumour may range
between five and forty years. Koelling, among others, notes that
authorities estimate that 60 to 90 per cent of all cancers are caused by
environmental factors, but that it is difficult to establish direct causal
104 See generally, J. Swaigen, "Procedure in Environmental Regulation" in P. Fmkle & A.
Lucas, eds., Environmental Law in the 1980s: A New Beginning, Proceedings of a Colloquium
(Calgary- Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1982). The colloquium was held in Banff, British
Columbia, 27-29 November 1981.
105 Rawson Academy of Aquatic Sciences, supra note 98 at 4 (also see this document
regarding proposed regulations of dioxins and furans under CEPA). More generally, see P.A.
Johnston et at., "Effluent Complexity, Ecotoxicological Response and Regulatory Implications"
(1990) Envtl. Poll. 1-ICEP.1 570.
106 J. Trauberman, "Statutory Reform of 'Toxic Torts': Relieving Legal, Scientific, and
Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim" (1983) 7 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 177 at 19&
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agent-effect linkages because of the lengthy latency periods of many
carcinogensj 07 Chronic effects that result from long-term, low-level
exposure to toxic or hazardous substances often go undetected until
considerable damage has been done.108 Even when the potential harm is
large but subject to some uncertainty (as in the cases of the widely used
defoliant Agent Orange 09 and pulp mill effluents110), or when the
proximate sources of the damage are not easily established, or when the
1 0 7 Koelling, supra note 6 at 207. See also Trauberman, ibid at 180.
108 Chronic or sub-lethal effects are numerous. For example, the pesticide residue DDB
induced the thinning of eggshells and reproductive failure in cormorants in Lake Michigan in 1964,
and herring-gulls, cormorants, and common terns in Lake Ontario between 1963 and 1970: M.
Gilbertson, "Epidemics in Birds and Mammals Caused by Chemicals in the Great Lakes" in M.S.
Evans, ed., Toxic Contaminants and Ecosystem Health: a Great Lakes Focus (New York- J. Wiley &
Sons, 1988) 133.
In general, chronic environmental or ecosystem effects can include impaired reproductive
ability, birth defects, reduced food conversion efficiency, spatial disorientation in affected species,
and changes in species composition in community structures that alter the dynamics among
predators and prey species. For a general discussion of these issues, see M.A. Kamrin, Taicology
(Chelsea, Michigan: Lewis, 1988) at 35ff.
109 Agent Orange was originally thought to be a model herbicide, but was later found to
impose significant risk and danger to the environment and to human health. The danger, which was
suspected as early as the late 1960s, is caused by a by-product of an intermediate stage of the
manufacturing process that remains in the final product only in trace amounts. This chemical,
2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), is one of the organochiorine chemical family and has
been described as "perhaps the most toxic molecule ever synthesized by man": A. Galston,
Chairman, Department of Biology, Yale University, (interview), as cited in Schuck, supra note 29 at
18. On this topic, see generally, SA. Skene, LC. Dewhurst & M. Greenberg, "Polychlorinated
Dibenzo-p-dioxins and Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans: The Risks to Human Health. A Review"
(1989) 8 Human Toxic. 173.
110 Pulp mill effluents from mills using chlorine-bleaching technologies contain a large
number of organochorines including TCDD and TCDF. rcDF (2,3,7,8-tetracborodibenzofuran) is
approximately one-tenth as toxic as the dioxin, but its prevalence in pulpmill effluent is about ten
times that of the dioxin. The complex chemicals associated with pulp mill effluent, for example, are
now the subject of considerable scientific scrutiny and public concern because of their high toxicity
and the significant damaging effects they cause in aquatic ecosystems in concentrations as low as 1
part per billion (ppb) in mill effluent Yet the toxic effects of dioxins and furans on the environment
have been suspected from as early as the 1960s, and their presence in pulp mill effluent has been
known since 1983 when concentrations of greater than 50 parts per thousand (ppt) were discovered
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in fish downstream from several mills in Wisconsim
C. Van Strum & P. B. Merrell, No Margin of Safety: A Preliminay Repor on Dioxin Pollution and the
Need for Emergency Action in the Pulp and Paper Industry (Washingtom Greenpeace USA, 1987).
Nevertheless, it was not until dioxins were detected in sludge samples from Ontario pulp mills in
1986 and a number of shellfish fishing areas in B.C. were dosed in 1989 because of contamination,
that regulation of these substances became a priority with federal and provincial governments in
Canada. See Waldichuk, supra note 33. As he concludes, at 366, "[t]he haunting question remains:
How many other substances are being inadvertently produced by industry that we are not yet aware
of or that we cannot measure with our present state of analytical technology?"
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delay between exposure and effect is large, regulation may be delayed
pending the availability of more conclusive evidence.
11
In this light, it is not surprising that the courts have often cited
intervening causes, remoteness, and foreseeability as reasons to deny
liability in such cases. This is especially a problem in industrialized
areas, where several point sources of the same or different pollutants
may contribute to the causation of the same disease.112 The denial of a
claim on such bases may occur "even though it is generally accepted that
excessive exposure to the pollutant is unhealthy."'1 3 Whatever the
obstacle, the courts' denial of liability in these terms points to the
inherent difficulties of demonstrating causation when spatial and
temporal latencies exist. As was evident in the Palmer decision discussed
above,114 judges make such decisions after scientific experts are queried
on the possibility of making type I errors, but they are rarely queried
about type II errors. Biased decision making in favour of possible
polluters can thereby result.
1 1 1 For a review of this problem in American Legislation see Eournoy, supra note 6 at 330ff.
112 Trauberman, supra note 106 at 181, points out that
toxic tort plaintiffs must explain a disease's etiology, or manner in which the hazardous
substance caused the condition. In cases involving chronic health effects, however, any of
numerous factors may be the cause of the condition. Furthermore, because the relative
contribution of genetic makeup and external environment to human health is difficult to
determine, discerning the extent to which environmental contaminants contribute to any
particular illness may be likewise difficult.
113 RJ. Roberts & J.L. Sullivan, "The Role of the Technological Expert in Complex
Environmental litigation" (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 65 at 93. They noted, at 81, that
these problems can arise in a variety of contexts, for example, showing that air, water or
noise pollution from the defendant's operation and not the operations of his neighbours
caused the injury; showing that an oil slick which damaged beaches or property came
from a particular ship; or showing that health problems resulted from the defendant's
pollution and not from disease.
In the much discussed case ofAlrn v. United States, 461 F.2d 810 (U.S. Ct. of Claims 1972) at
817, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that he had been harmed in his work (as distinct from his
personal life) because he "failed to prove that his duties ... caused him to be 'exposed to dangerously
high concentrations' ... 'which [were] likely to cause serious disease. " The case illustrates the
limitations of science in determining at what level exposure to substances begins to have toxic
effects and, even when toxic effects are shown, the difficulty of establishing the causal connection
and effect of one of several sources of exposure.
1 1 4 See text accompanying notes 45-50.
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C. The Assumption of Effective Regulation
The assumption of assimilative capacity when science is
uncertain has led to serious practical problems for government agencies
in the implementation of permissive regulatory strategies. For instance,
the success of any regulatory system based on a substance-by-substance
approach is dependent on access of the regulatory agency to high levels
of funding, expert staffing, and sufficient research and enforcement
facilities. The vast number of chemicals to be tested for toxicity and
monitored in industrial effluents, in addition to the large number and
types of individual industrial operations subject to regulation, create
difficult practical problems for regulatory agencies.
For example, in place of independent government testing and
monitoring programmes, regulatory agencies often rely on industry
research and even self-policing.1' 5 This puts the government at a
disadvantage because-the industry is then "uniquely well supplied with
information on product and process characteristics, abatement
technology and costs, production and effluent volumes, and numerous
other variables. ' '116 In one well-documented example, American
investigators found that test results produced by IBT Laboratories,
which were used as a basis for regulatory approval of more than 100
pesticides in the United States and Canada, were "invalid for reasons
ranging from sloppy experimental procedure to apparent outright
fabrication."11 7 Even where industry testing is honestly undertaken,
agencies may not have sufficient resources or access to the raw data to
allow them to evaluate properly the experimental design and the
statistical power of the results.
The combination of the above factors-the problematic
assumption of assimilative capacity, the limited scientific understanding
of environmental effects, and constrained agency resources-has created
a situation in which the environment is effectively treated as a free good.
This leads to externalization of the true costs of industrial production
through the degradation of environmental quality and an increase in
public health risks. Yet, in attempting to correct this after the fact,
private citizens and public regulators may confront significant
1 15 A standard procedure, for example, is to have the industry conduct its own monitoring and
submit the results to the regulatory agency, which itself only occasionally checks the discharges
directly. Castrilll & Vigod, supra note 20, discuss this problem more fully.
1 16 Schrecker, supra note 2 at 12.
1 17 bid. at 12-13.
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transaction costs, including the costs of litigation, negotiation, and
regulation. Avoiding these costs leads to economically inefficient
outcomes which may favour polluters. For example, where a Crown
prosecutor weighs the costs of litigation against its potential benefits,
pollution may not be penalized until the harm to individuals exceeds
their transaction costs. Given the uncertainty of litigation, this cost is
higher, and the inefficiency greater, than necessary. For example,
because causation must usually be "proven," the plaintiff is often faced
with the potentially prohibitive financial burden of conducting scientific
research and obtaining expert testimony, and this is in addition to the
already high costs of any legal action. These practical problems are
inherent in the post factum, reactive character of the permissive
regulatory strategy.
In Canada, this situation has encouraged a strategy based on
negotiated, rather than enforced, compliance between industry and
government. One prominent Canadian commentator has noted that
the rules of environmental regulation are never clearly stated or certain, except in a
purely symbolic sense. Instead the norms of conduct are the subject of negotiation and
renegotiation between the regulator and the regulated right down to the moment of
compliance and noncompliance. In this sense, rules stated in statutes or regulations are
merely points of departure for negotiating modifications of behaviour...
The significant point is that no matter how normative measures are expressed in a
statute-whether as policy guidelines or as command prohibitions-the end result in the
case of environmental regulation is a bargaining process.
118
Negotiations between the stakeholders in environmental regulation
(government, industry, and the public) as the basis for setting standards
may be an effective approach, so long as all affected parties are involved
in the process and the ability of government to force technological
development is not compromised.-1 9 With the inclusion of a clause in
the new federal pulp and paper regulations that allows mills to delay
compliance from 1993 to 1995 under special circumstances-over
118 A.R. Thompson, Environmental Regulation in Canada: An Assessment of the Regulatory
Process (WVestwater Research Centre, 1980) at 33-34.
119 In the absence, however, of strong public interest representation in such negotiations, the
implementation of standards based on the "best available technology" may be compromised by
industry's paramount concerns for economic and technical feasibility, leading instead to standards
which reflect only the "best practicable technology." For a discussion of this in the pulp and paper
industry, see W.F. Sinclair, Controlling Pollution From Canadian Pulp and Paper Manufacturers: A
Federal Perspective (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1990). See also generally, P.A. Victor et al.,
Environmental Protection Regulation: Water Pollution, and the Pulp and Paper Industry (Technical
Report No. 14) (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1981). See also D.B. La Pierre,
"Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes" (1977) 62 Iowa L. Rev. 771.
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objections by environmental interest groups-the acceptability of this
approach among the stakeholders is far from complete. Negotiation as
the basis for ensuring compliance is, however, even more problematic, as
it may politicize what should be a predictable enforcement process,
ultimately making compliance voluntary. This tends to be the case
where a continuous negotiating process costs less for the industry than
actually complying with existing regulations.1 2 In British Columbia, this
strategy led to the widespread granting of exceptions to compliance.
Under section 11 of the B.C. Waste Management Act and the Special
Waste Regulations,121 the government manager has extensive powers to
amend permits and approvals "on his own initiative where he considers
it hecessary, or on application by a holder of a permit or ... an approval."
In addition, the Minister may issue a variance order if he believes "that a
person should have temporary relief from the requirements of an order,
permit, approval, licence or waste management plan."122 With no public
notice requirement for a permit amendment or a variance order, permit
applicants and government officials can quietly negotiate lower
standards.
The results of this procedure have not been encouraging, even
for those few chemicals which are subject to regulatory standards. Of
122 direct discharge pulp and paper mills in Canada in 1985, a
nationwide compliance survey indicated that 26 (21 per cent) were not in
compliance with national biological oxygen demand (BOb) standards, 47
(39 per cent) were not in compliance with total suspended solids (TSs)
standards, and 83 (68 per cent) were out of compliance with toxicity
requirements.123 In British Columbia, a 1989 survey indicated that 21
out of 22 mills in the province were in violation of their permits-and
the one mill that was listed as being in compliance was operating under a
120 F. Anderson et al., in Environmental Improvement Through Economic Incentives
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) at 16, point out that, from the point of view of
industry negotiators, "the benefits of delay are typically so great in comparison with the costs of
complying that there is little incentive for voluntary compliance."
121 B.C. Reg. 63/88.
122 Waste ManagementAct, supra note 84, s. 13.
123 Sinclair, supra note 119 at 294.
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variance order.1 24 Another study125 indicated that, for the period
between January 1985 and May 1987, in two Waste Management Branch
(wMB) regions in British Columbia, 63 per cent of all class 1 permits 26
were out of compliance over half the time that inspections were made.
However, the most stringent action taken was the writing of a letter
requesting a meeting with industry representatives to discuss ways of
bringing the violating plants into compliance.12 7 In the last few years,
under public pressure, more sizable fines have been assessed in British
Columbia. 2
8
In conclusion, the regulatory paradigm underlying Canadian
pollution legislation is critically weakened by a number of problems: its
assumption of the environment's assimilative capacity, its failure to
124 West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation Newsletter, Special Pulp Pollution
Edition: Pulp Pollution Campaign Update (1990) 14:4 at 5. Similarly, in a recent study entitled
Report on the 1989 Industrial Direct Discharges in Ontario, 93 of 170 industrial plants exceeded their
average monthly limits for environmental discharges. See M. Mittelstaedt, "Major Ontario
companies exceeded pollution limits" The [Toronto] Globe andMal (13 July 1991) A3.
125 R.M. Brown & TM. Rankin, "Persuasion, Penalties and Prosecution: The Treatment of
Repeat Offenders Under British Columbia's Occupational Health and Safety and Pollution Control
Legislation" (1988) Faculty of Law, University of Victoria at 20-29 [forthcoming in the U.B.C Law
Rev.].
126 The Ministry of the Environment Procedural Manual places permits in one of four
compliance-impact groups. Class 1 consists of permits that are in "significant non-compliance" and
that are also causing a "high environmental impact." Non-compliance refers to the degree, in terms
of both frequency and severity, to which the permit's quality and quantity parameters are exceeded.
Environmental impact refers to the effect on the receiving environment (both potential and actual
harm). Class 3 permits are also in significant non-compliance but have low environmental impact.
Class 2 and 4 permits are listed as being in compliance with high and low environmental impact
respectively. See Brown & Rankin, ib& at 20-22.
12 7 The Procedural Manual assigns a high priority to the enforcement of Class 1 permits. The
escalation of responses to be taken by wm officials is as follows: writing the permittee and
requesting suggestions for remedial action; meeting with company representatives to explore
remedies; escalation to a more senior level meeting;, issuance of a ticket; and, only in the last resort,
prosecution. L Kolankiewicz, "Compliance with Pollution Control Permits in the Lower Fraser
Valley, 1967-1981" (1986-87) 72 B.C. Stud. 28, also notes this general trend of non-compliance and
negotiation.
128 Province of British Columbia, Ministry of the Environment, Lands and Parks, News
Release "Environmental Charges and Fnes Announced" (4 September 1992). In the 1990-91 fiscal
year, 466 charges were laid, and $1,059,051 in fines were levied for 244 convictions. In 1991-92, a
total of 469 charges were laid with only 154 convictions. However, the average fine level had
increased, with a total of $1,032,500 in fines. See also Sandbom et al, supra note 7 at 49.
In July 199, the B.C. provincial government introduced a new fee structure for waste
management permits under the Waste Management Act. The new fee structure reflects both the
quantity and quality of pollutants in the discharge. However, the fee structure is only intended to
raise sufficient funds to compensate for the administration and monitoring of permits and does not
fully reflect the environmental costs of the discharges. See Waste Management Permit Fees
Regulation, 432/82 and Order in Council No. 1264,30 July 1992.
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acknowledge the implications of scientific uncertainty, and its unrealistic
expectations of regulatory agencies. In short, such a system of regulation
does not ensure long-term environmental quality as it was designed to
do but, instead, inefficiently employs agency resources to facilitate the
externalization of the environmental and social costs of industrial
production.
V. PRECEDENTS FOR INCREMENTAL REFORM
In response to the difficulties experienced with permissive
regulation, many national governments and international regulatory
bodies have begun to shift from the control of pollution to varying
degrees of pollution reduction. In addition to alternative approaches,
however, the potential exists for incremental reforms within the
framework of permissive regulation itself.
A. Lowering the Standard of Proof
A number of precedents exist in common law tort actions where
the standard of proof has been lowered to protect environmental values
and public health. American courts have shown a particular willingness
to accept uncertain scientific information as sufficient to establish a fact
on "the preponderance of the evidence."
1. Creation of risk as evidence
In Wdisonville v. SCA Services, Inc. ,129 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that "there can be no doubt but that it is highly probable that the
chemical-waste-disposal site will bring about a substantial injury," and
that "if a court can prevent any damage from occurring, it should do
so."13 0 Ryan J., in his concurring comments, stated that "there are
situations where the harm that is potential is so devastating that equity
should afford relief even though the possibility of the harmful result
occurring is uncertain or contingent."131 Since many types of harm that
have potentially severe consequences are also characterized as having a
129 426 N.E. 2d 824 (IM. 1981).
130 kid. at 836-837.
131 Thid at 842 [emphasis added].
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low probability of occurrence, application of the traditional standard of
proof may lead to downplaying the likelihood and thus the potentially
high costs of the defendant's actions on society. Lowering the standard
of proof, by accepting evidence of "creation of risk," allows the courts to
make decisions which minimize judicial subjectivity when confronted
with uncertain proof of causation;132 to avoid serious harm which may
have only a small probability of occurrence; and, at the same time, to
achieve broader societal values.
InAllen v. United States,133 a case arising out of the 1963 nuclear
tests in Utah, the Court held that statistical evidence may be relied on to
create an inference of a causal link despite the lack of direct causal
evidence:
Where the injuries are causally indistinguishable, and where experts cannot determine
whether individual injury arises from culpable human cause or non culpable natural
causes, evidence that there is an increased incidence of the injury in a population
following exposure to defendant's risk creating conduct may justify an inference of
.causal linkage."13 4
English courts too have considered the "creation of risk" as evidence of
causation in cases where there were multiple potential causes of injury
for which the court was unable to establish independent contributions.
In the oft-cited case of McGhee v. National Coal Board,1 35 the court
granted the plaintiff relief on the grounds that the action of the
defendant "materially increased the risk ... on a balance of
probabilities." 136 By thus accepting "creation of risk" as sufficient proof
of causation, the standard of proof was lowered and aprima facie case
was established, shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant. The
result was that the plaintiff "succeeded without proof that more probably
132 See generally, LD. Silver, "The Common Law of Environmental Risk and Some Recent
Applications" (1986) 10 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 61, who suggests, at 96-97, that historically the
"common laws experience with environmental risks highlights the absence of an objective approach
to deal with uncertainty ... The objective complexity of decision making in the face of uncertainty
has reduced our description of the process to a subjective simplicity-the hunch."
133 588 F. Supp. 247 (1984).
134 1bid at 253.
135 [1972] All E.R. 1008 (IL) [hereinafterMcGhee].
1361bid. at 1013. In this case, an employee was exposed to brick dust with a risk of dermatitis
at the worksite and was put at risk for an additional period of time because the employer failed to
provide after-work shower facilities. Experts were unable to determine the relative contributions to
the total risk of the two causes, and the Court could make no useful distinction between a source
contributing to the risk of the disease and a source contributing to the disease itself.
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than not it was [the defendant] that had caused his injury."13 7 Although
not following McGhee, the recent Supreme Court of Canada case of
Farrell reached essentially the same result by drawing an inference of
causation adverse to the defendant despite the lack of clear proof, which
the defendant was then unable to rebut 138 There is, however,
considerable uncertainty as to how far the judiciary will allow this
approach to develop.139
In effect, risk-benefit analysis alters what needs to be proven by
relieving the plaintiff of demonstrating that the occurrence of harm is
more probable than not. Instead, the plaintiff need only show both that
there exists a mere risk of harm, and that the costs of that risk to the
plaintiff outweigh the benefits to the defendant. Similarly, in enforcing
regulatory standards, substituting a "risk-benefit analysis" approach for a
damage-oriented, punitive approach could effectively lower the standard
of proof by allowing the plaintiff to establish merely that the expected
costs of potential environmental degradation that could be induced are
greater than the expected benefits. A common approach to calculating
the expected costs and benefits of proposed activities is to measure the
possible cost of environmental degradation multiplied by the probability
of occurrence, against the expected benefit of a new technology or
development multiplied by the probability that there will be a benefit.1 40
The risk-benefit approach has been applied in a number of
environmental cases in the United States. In Reserve Mining Co. v.
13 7 J.G. Fleming, "Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 661 at 669.
13 8 Supra note 51. In this case, the plaintiff had suffered an eye injury after being operated on
by the defendant. Although direct causation could not be established, the Court found that the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to support an inference of causation, based on
common sense, despite the absence of medical proof. InFarrell, the Court effectively reduced the
standard of proof on the plaintiff which allowed the Court to draw an inference on the facts adverse
to the defendant but without shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. In McGhee, however,
the Court stated that the plaintiff hadprima facie proven his case, thus shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant. As the Court in Farrell noted, at 330, "It]he legal or ultimate burden remains with
the plaintiff, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by the defendant, an inference
of causation may be drawn, although positive or scientific proof of causation has not been adduced."
139 Recent decisions in the United Kingdom and Australia diverge in their treatment of these
issues, leading J.G. Fleming, "Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law: A Postscript" (1991) 70 Can. Bar
Rev. 136 at 141, to remark that "[w]e are awaiting the next move in the causality game."
140 See, for example, the American Toxic Substances ControlAct (Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat.
2003 (1976)) which provides, at c. 6(c)(1), that decisions to prevent certain risks from chemical
substances will be based upon a balancing of the risks against the benefits of substances and the
economic consequences of regulation. This approach is discussed in "Risk-Benefit Analysis and
Technology-Forcing Under the Taxic Substances ControlAct" (1977) 62 Iowa L Rev. 942 at 948.
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Environmental Protection Agency,141 an injunction was sought against the
discharge of mine tailings containing asbestos fibres into Lake
Superior-the community's drinking water supply. Availability of
injunctive relief depended on the applicability of the "imminent hazard"
provision under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Scientific
evidence was inconclusive on the key issue of whether the discharge
would cause increased rates of cancer in the community, so the Court
decided that the "concepts of potential harm, whether they be assessed
as 'probabilities and consequences' or 'risk and harm' necessarily must
apply."1 42 Applying a risk-benefit analysis, the Court interpreted
"endangerment" to mean a threat of risk of harm, rather than a risk of
harm itself, and the injunction was upheld even though it was not
possible to conclude that "the probability of harm was more likely than
not."143  This decision was cited in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 44 where the Court upheld EPA regulations requiring a
reduction of lead components in fuel, based on the determination that
there was a "significant risk" to public health, without requiring proof of
either actual or even probable harm.
Kuster argues that a more general application of risk-benefit
analyses to prove causation, and a resultant lowering of the standard of
proof, should depend on a court's analysis of three issues: (1) the
seriousness of the potential injury in terms of both the extent and the
type of harm, (2) the benefits of the activity and the effects of a damage
award or injunction on these activities, and (3) the degree of uncertainty
in the scientific information introduced as evidence.1 45 This latter factor
must then be balanced against the results of the inquiries regarding the
seriousness of harm and its possible benefits. Essentially, an activity
associated with serious harm or low benefits would require a less certain,
i.e., lower, standard of proof of causation. Nevertheless, problems
remain in estimating costs and benefits as many of the variables in a risk
assessment are unquantifiable, and the probabilities of occurrence of
different outcomes, as well as the range of possible outcomes, may not
141 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
142 IbiS at 520.
143 Ibid. The injunction was allowed with the provision that the company must have a
"reasonable" time to abate the discharges. This decision takes a more precautionary regulatory
approach in order to protect public health against the potential for adverse effects, a decision which
was consistent with the preventative purpose of the federalAct.
144 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
145 B.W. Kuster, "Toxic Substance Contamination: The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation
Analysis" (1980) 14 J. of L Ref. 53 at 63-64.
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be known with any degree of certainty. In addition, treatment of
intangible costs, intergenerational effects, and synergistic and cumulative
effects assessment are difficult, given the uncertainties involved.
Despite these limitations, the risk-benefit approach has
important implications for the Canadian environmental regulatory
framework, which have not allowed for the "creation of risk" as
adequate proof of an offence. For instance, causing harm to the
receiving environment is not directly prohibited under the B.C. Waste
Management Act, even though this may be the intent of the Act. The
focus instead is on preventing unauthorized discharges which cause
pollution. In this regard, the prosecution must establish that the
discharge fits the statutory definition of pollution--"the presence in the
environment of substances or contaminants that substantially alter or
impair the usefulness of the environment" 146-rather than just
demonstrating the creation of a risk as sufficient proof of this element of
the offence.
Similarly, for offences under sections 35(1) and 36(3) of the
Fisheries Act the standard of proof would be lowered if it were sufficient
to establish that an accused's activity put a fish habitat at risk. Indeed,
the standard and burden of proof required to establish elements of an
offence under the Fisheries Act have been somewhat relaxed through the
use of inferences.1 47 It is yet to be seen whether risk of harm will be
sufficient to regulate substances under CEPA, although the phrase "may
have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment" in
section 11 of the Act could well be interpreted in this way. Finally, the
International Joint Commission has recently proposed that governments
adopt a "weight of evidence" approach to "the identification and virtual
elimination of persistent toxic substances" 148 in the Great Lakes.
146 Waste Management.Act, supra note 84, s. 1.
14 7 Thompson & Rueggeberg, supra note 76 at 167, note that provisions in the Fisheries Act
"in some cases reverse the onus of proof, in others change the standard of proof to a balance of
probabilities, and in still others, obviate the need for assessing the weight of evidence by deeming
that certain inferences are facts."
148 Sixth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality, (1992) at 21-22. As the
Commissioners note, at 21-22, "[c]ritics have attempted to find flaws with individual studies in order
to discredit findings and conclusions about persistent toxic substances. While limitations to study
design may exist, this does not necessarily invalidate the findings and conclusions when considered
in a weight-of-evidence context."
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2. The right to environmental quality
In the United States, a number of states have enacted legislation
that specifically seeks to secure a right to environmental quality by
lowering the standard of proof and, on some issues, by shifting the
burden onto the defendant. Similar to the judicial acceptance of
"creation of risk," acts like the Michigan Environmental Protection Act149
alter the standard and burden of proof rules. The plaintiff may establish
a prima facie case by showing that the defendant's actions are merely
likely to harm the environment. The burden of proof then shifts to the
defendant, who must show that his or her conduct was reasonable "by
way of an affirmative defence, that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative ... and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of
the public heath, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount
concern for the protection of its natural resources."150 The MEPA
defines a violation as the "impairment" of a "natural resource," but the
Act does not establish a threshold which must be met by the plaintiff,
thus making it possible for the courts to apply the statute flexibly. The
MEPA also allows the court to "determine the validity, applicability and
reasonableness of the standard," and, if the court decides that a standard
is deficient, it may "direct the adoption of a standard approved and
specified by the court."151
Establishing the affirmative defence may be onerous for the
defendant. Abrams argues that "[i]f a low level of environmental harm
satisfies the threshold, defendants will be forced to explore alternative
courses of action in a greater range of cases."152 If so, this could be a
149 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter MEPAJ. The
MEPA is discussed in detail here as an early example of this type of legislation. Similar laws were
subsequently adopted in other states. See generally, D. Alessi, MJ. Wright & M.P. Treiber,
"Shifting the Burden of Proof in State Environmental Protection Acts: A Blessing to Environmental
Plaintiffs" (1978) 8 Envtl. L 851; and R1-L Abrams, "Thresholds of Harm in Environmental
Litigation: The Michigan Environmental Protection Act as a Model of a Minimal Requirement"
(1983) 7 Harv. Envtl. LR. 107. Cases filed under the MEPA have dealt with a wide range of
activities including several different types of air pollution, atomic energy generation, fish and game
management, land use, land drainage and construction, mining operations, oil and gas leasing, park
management, road development, shoreline protection, wetlands protection, solid waste disposal,
stream channelization, toxic substances, water management, water pollution, and municipal
treatment systems. For an overview of cases under the MiEPA, see D.. Slone, "The Michigan
Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated Environmental Suits into the 1980's"
(1985) 12 Ecology LQ. 27L
15 0 MEPA, s. 3(1).
15 1 bL ss. 2(2)(a) and 2(2)(2b).
152 Supra note 149 at 116.
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significant step toward a more preventative and less legalistic approach
to environmental protection. In assessing alternatives, economic criteria
must not determine the outcome. Rather, it should be shown that there
are unique non-economic problems which preclude the selection of
other hlternatives 53 As Abrams notes:
It as advocated, an exceedingly low threshold is employed under MEPA, litigants and
courts alike will often find that the crux of litigation is the alternatives issue. In fact, this
is salutary. the focus becomes how best to improve decisionmaking instead of a
nit-picking debate about how much harm will ensue.1 54
This single technique of emphasizing alternative processes encourages
the courts to make innovative decisions in spite of scientific uncertainty
about causal relationships, thus reducing the potential costs to society
and to the environment by minimizing type II errors. Such an approach
has not yet made an appearance in Canadian legislation.
B. Shifting the Burden of Proof
A.few common law precedents exist in which the traditional
allocation of the burden of proof has been reversed so that the
defendant had to prove that he was not the cause of the injury. The
theory of "alternate liability," as set out in Cook 55 applies in situations
in which there is more than one possible defendant or cause of harm. As
discussed above, the negligence of the two defendants had been
established, but the plaintiff could not prove which one was at fault and,
therefore, caused the injury. The court reversed the burden so as to
require each defendant to absolve himself by showing on a balance of
probabilities that he was not to be held responsible for the injury. In
other words, the defendants were given the task of proving that their
actions were not harmful.
The applicability of the alternative liability rule to environmental
regulatory issues is, however, limited since it requires that harm already
have occurred, that there is a proven and limited number of possible
causes of the harm, and that the negligence of the defendants has been
established. The overall burden on the prosecution is thus still high,
153 In fact, the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, § 116B at § 11613.04, explicitly rejects
consideration of economic factors as rebutting a prima facie case or as serving as an affirmative
defence. Abrams, supra note 149 at 116, discusses specific cases which "confirm the stringency of
the requirements for establishing a successful affirmative defense."
154 Supra note 149 at 117.
155 Supra note 43.
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especially in quasi-criminal regulatory environmental offences where the
higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is still applied. In
such cases, each defendant would only need to raise a doubt that points
to one of the others as the cause of harm to make it difficult to convict
any of the defendants.
Going beyond the alternative liability rule is the common law
tort standard of strict liability where "[a]nyone having care or control of
a substance likely to do harm [is] to be held strictly liable for the
consequences should it escape."156 Strict liability, which does not
reverse the burden of proof but removes the burden of establishing the
defendant's negligence, has been explicitly recognized in some
environmental protection acts in Canada.157 For instance, under the
"Ontario Spills Act" 158 the costs of clean-up are subject to absolute
liability rules, and strict liability is applied to loss or damage from spills.
Plaintiffs are not required to show that the defendant was at fault or was
negligent in allowing the spill, but the "due diligence defence" is open to
the defendant once the offence has been shown. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R. v. Sault Ste. Marie159 formally
established that the regulatory pollution offence is indeed a strict
liability offence.
In Sault Ste. Marie, the Court identified three bases for liability:
(1) the mens rea offence, in which some positive state of mind such as
intent or knowledge or recklessness must be proved by the prosecution;
(2) the strict liability offence, in which it is not necessary for the
156 Swanson, supra note 39 at 89.
157 P.N. Nemetz, "Federal Environmental Regulation in Canada" (1986) 26 Nat. Resources J.
551 at 581, points out that the type of liability and burden of proof vary by jurisdiction and statute.
However, most legislation is not explicit on the interpretation of liability and the due diligence
defence is commonly assumed. Nemetz discusses, at 582, specific provisions for absolute liability
under the Ontario "Spills Bill," the federalArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-
12, and the Manitoba Fishennen'sAssistance and Polluter'sLiabilityAct, S.M. 1970, c. 32.
158 Environmental ProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, Part IX. The most far-reaching strict
liability legislation in this area is the American Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation andLiabilityAct (the Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9657.
159 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 [hereinafter Sault Ste. Marie]. In that case, the accused had an
agreement with a private company, Cherokee Disposal and Construction Co. Ltd., for the disposal
of the city's garbage. The waste disposal method caused nearby bodies of water to become polluted.
'The contracted company was convicted of a breach of s. 32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 332. The question before the Court in Sault Ste. Marie was whether the city was also
guilty of an offence under that section. Section 32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources Act prohibits
discharging, causing to be discharged, permitting to be discharged, or depositing materials into a




prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea (instead, the prosecution
must establish aprima facie case that the act occurred-it then being left
to the accused to avoid liability by proving that all reasonable care was
taken by exercising "due diligence"); and (3) offences of absolute
liability, where it is not open to the accused to show an absence of fault
as a defence. Again, however, judicial obstacles prevent the seemingly
stricter approach from having the desired effect in environmental cases.
In this case it was clearly established that a discharger who violates the
terms of a licence or permit may defend itself by showing that due
diligence was exercised. This can be established, for instance, by
showing that equipment did not perform according to design
specifications or that reasonable care was exercised by ordering and
installing pollution control equipment. Once the occurrence of the
offence has been successfully established by the prosecution, the
defendant may establish the due diligence defence on the balance of
probabilities, which is relatively easy16" in comparison with the
prosecution's subsequent task of rebutting the defence beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 61 While the strict liability offence does shift some of
160 In proving aclus reus, the Crown's case "must be based on a single act or a narrowly
time-limited series of acts" and thus the prosecution is restricted to an extremely narrow range of
evidence. This is not the case for the defence of due diligence. As noted by Swaigen, supra note 104
at 97:
[W]hile the Crown is restricted to prosecuting for such narrowly circumscribed activities,
the defendant is free to put in issue a wide array of circumstances if it feels this will help
to establish due diligence. To illustrate, if the Crown charges a company with committing
a single air pollution incident, it would then be open to the company to prove the general
expenditure of funds on pollution abatement, and instructions issued to employees over
several years. The company could launch an inquiry into its labour-management
relations over a period of years in an attempt to show that the employees had been
instructed in the methods of avoiding pollution but were uncooperative ... [The]
cumulative effect [of such evidence] may well convince the Court that on the balance of
probabilities the company had exercised due diligence to prevent the incident, unless the
Crown can rebut it.
161 To rebut the defence, more sophisticated and extensive investigations are required to
determine whether a company actually took all possible precautions to avert the pollution. This can
be a formidable task considering that the defendants usually have exclusive access to information
regarding their actions to prevent the pollution. As Swaigen, ibid. at 94, notes:
jP]ollution inspectors trained to take samples of toxic materials and trace a pollution trail
to its source, will now also have to establish who gave the orders that led to the pollution,
who carried them out, what supervision was provided, how the equipment was
maintained, and many other matters that could only be ascertained by taking statements,
scrutinizing documents, auditing financial records, and dissecting the relationships within
corporations and between interlocking corporations.
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the legal burden onto the polluter,1 62 the extensive investigation and the
use of expert witnesses required to rebut the due diligence defence add
to the expense and difficulty of prosecuting a strict liability offence.
Finally, strict liability offences have been challenged under
section 11(d) of the Canaadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,163 which
provides the right "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty," and
under section 7 of the Charter, the "right to life, liberty and security of
the person ... in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
With respect to section 7 challenges, while it is generally held that to
prevent punishment of the morally innocent,164 proof of subjective intent
(mens rea) is necessary, the decision in Sault Ste. Marie indicates that, for
public welfare offences, the defence of due diligence or reasonable
mistake of fact provides adequate protection for the morally innocent.
Moreover, because regulatory offences are generally part of a larger
system of administration that permits certain behaviours under
controlled conditions, it can be assumed that by agreeing to the
conditions of regulation there is a tacit intent to comply.165
It may be more difficult, however, for strict liability offences to
remain consistent with the requirement of presumption of innocence set
out in section 11(d) of the Charter. Here, the Crown must prove all of
the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court of Canada has been inconsistent on the onus which this
creates, but the trend seems to be to find elements of the strict liability
offence contrary to the Charter.166 In the recent case of R. v. Wholesale
162 The accused must establish due diligence based on the objective standard of the
reasonable person in the circumstances (R. v. Ellis-Don (1990), 24 A.C.W.S. (3d) 188). The
standard of care is based on the seriousness of the risk of harm, so that a greater possibility of a
more serious risk of harm requires that more precautions be taken (P. v. Placer Developments Ltd.
(1983), 13 C.E.lR. 42 (Y. Ten. Ct.)).
163 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UY..), 1982, c. 1L [hereinafter Charter].
164 Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 159 at 1326.
1 65 See K.R. Webb, "Regulatory Offences, the Mental Element and the Charter. Rough Road
Ahead" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 419, especially at 449. Webb argues, at 453, that "an objective
negligence standard is justifiable when it is part of a regulatory regime because advertence, the full
mens rea mental element, has been reasonably attributed to the regulated accused as a
pre-condition to that accused being permitted to engage in a certain activity."
166 This issue had previously split the Supreme Court of Canada in the cases of A v. Holmes,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 914 [hereinafter Holmes]; A v. Whyle, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Whyte]; andAIt
v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443 [hereinafter Schwartz]. In Holmes and Schwartz, the Court held that
requiring the accused to establish a defence on the balance of probabilities did not violate s. 11(d)
as the Crown satisfied its duty once it had successfully proven the essential elements of the offence.
In Whyte, Dickson CJ. held that the distinction between the elements of the offence and those of
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Travel Group Inc,1 67 the Supreme Court of Canada was virtually
unanimous in its supportive approach to corporate Charter standing and
remedial entitlement, which will inevitably add support to corporate
interests in what appears to be a new trend in challenging state
regulatory activities!68 However, on the more controversial issue of the
constitutionality of the due diligence defence, the Court held, by a very
thin majority,169 that the strict liability offence created in Sault Ste. Marie
the defence is irrelevant to the s. 11(d) issue. He stated that the real concern is whether an accused
maybe convicted when a reasonable doubt exists.
167 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 [hereinafter Wholesale Travel]. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
issues were: (1) whether a corporation has the capacity to invoke Charter protection in the
regulatory process, (2) whether the retraction provisions in the impugned sections of the
Competition Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34) were unconstitutional, and (3) whether the due diligence
defence contained in theAct infringed the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by ss. 7 and
11(d) of the Charier.
In the Ontario Court of Appeal (i. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1990), 70 O.R. (2d)
545) Tarnopolsky J.A, for the majority, held that the imposition "of a persuasive burden on the
accused to prove that he or she acted with due diligence violates s. 11(d) because it permits
conviction despite a reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused."
168 See generally, C. Tollefson, "Case Comment: ?. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc." (1992) 71
Can. Bar Rev. 369.
169 Two judges held that the due diligence provisions were constitutionally sound, three held
that the provisions infringed s. 11(d) but were sustained by s. 1 of the Charter. The remaining four
judges would not have upheld the due diligence provision, arguing that they were unconstitutional
under both as. 11(d) and 1. The majority of the Court viewed the strict liability offence as an
"essential means of enforcing public policy without which the state's regulatory capacity would be
substantially reduced." See Tollefson, ibkt& at 374.
The Court was in agreement on the first two requirements of the test set out in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes]. This case states, at 105-06, that when the state Is
attempting to justify a limit on a right to freedom under s. 1 of the Charter, it must follow a
procedure, which involves the application of four criteria: (1) the objective of the impugned
provision must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom; (2) the means chosen to achieve the objective must be "rationally connected" to the
objective and not arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations; (3) the means chosen must
impair the right or freedom in question as "little as possible" to accomplish the objective; and (4)
the means chosen must be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms are
proportional to the objective.
lacobucci J, speaking for the majority in Wholesale Travel, at 258, held that, with respect to
the third requirement of Oakes, the alternative means available to Parliament of achieving the
objective (the use of a "mandatory presumption of negligence" following from proof of the actus
reus) would
shift to the accused the burden of simply raising a reasonable doubt as to due diligence and
would not thereby allow the effective pursuit of the regulatory objective. It would leave the
Crown the legal burden of proving facts largely within the peculiar knowledge of the accused
[S]uch an alternative would in practice make it virtually impossible for the Crown to prove
public welfare offences ... and would effectively prevent governments from seeking to
implement public policy through prosecution.
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would be maintained. It is important to note that the reverse onus
provisions of strict liability regulatory offences, as created in Sault Ste.
Marie, came within a narrow margin of being constitutionally erased 7o
Should this decision be reversed in the future, the difficulties previously
experienced in prosecuting a strict liability offence will be amplified. In
general, then, while incremental reforms to lower the standard or shift
the burden of proof in both the common law and statutory provisions are
possible, Canadian initiatives in this area are few and encounter serious
legal obstacles, despite the clear policy justification for such a shift.
VI. STRUCTURAL REFORM THROUGH PREVENTATIVE
DESIGN
The lack of judicial innovation in Canada to overcome
intractable problems of establishing causation is an example of the
impediments to effective environmental protection within the existing
regulatory and judicial framework. More important still are the
technical and scientific problems that regulators who rely on
"end-of-pipe" solutions face daily. One international commentary
summarized these problems as follows:
(a) end-of-pipe abatement tends to transfer pollution from one medium to another,
where it may either cause equally serious environmental problems or even end up as
an indirect source of pollution to the same medium;
(b) although not as expensive as remediation of environmental damages, end-of-pipe
abatement contributes significantly to the costs of production processes and
products;
(c) end-of-pipe abatement of pollution requires regulation through control legislation
which is often costly and cumbersome, and leads to potentially inefficient regulatory
structures;
(d) end-of-pipe abatement technology represents a significant technological market with
an associated economic inertia which works against the reduction of pollution at the
source.1 71
As to the fourth requirement in the Oakes test, Iacobucci J. concluded, at 267-68, that since "the
regulated activity and the public welfare offence are a fundamental part of Canadian society," and
"the means chosen impair the right guaranteed by s. 11(d) as little as is reasonably possible, the
effects of the reverse onus on the presumption of innocence are proportional to the objective."
170 Tollefson, supra note 168 at 370, note 6, points out that the Supreme Court has been asked
to overrule Sault Ste. Marie on Charter grounds twice in the five months since Wholesale Travel was
handed down. In both cases, the invitation was declined for reasons in Wholesale Travel. It is
inevitable that more challenges to the constitutionality of Sault Ste. Marie will be brought.
171 T. Jackson & P.. Taylor, "The Precautionary Principle & the Prevention of Marine
Pollution" (Paper presented to the First International Ocean Pollution Symposium, Puerto Rico,
April 1991) at 35. The authors are members of the London Dumping Convention's (LDc's)
Scientific Group on Dumping.
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Thus, for example, the solution for improving local air quality, tall
stacks, was a major source of acid rain. Similarly, technologies to
remove heavy metals from effluent streams or particulate matter from
tall stacks merely transferred the pollution to landfills in the form of
sludges or flyash, which may then leach into the surrounding water table.
These control problems have, of course, been exacerbated by the
dramatically rising scale of the problem. As one study of American toxic
regulations has noted, "in 1940, the entire U.S. economy produced less
than 1 million tons of synthetic organic chemicals. By 1987, 125 million
tons of synthetic organics were produced-a 12,500 percent increase."1 72
Overcoming both the inherent contradictions of permissive
regulation and the escalating pollution problem requires a new
regulatory approach which does not merely treat waste once it has been
generated, but deals with it at its source through new production
processes. A range of terms have been used to describe this new
approach, such as waste minimization, waste reduction, toxics use
reduction, best available technology, and clean production. Toxics use
reduction, for example, is defined as
changes in production processes, products or raw materials that reduce, avoid, or
eliminate the use of toxic or hazardous substances and the generation of hazardous
byproducts per unit of production, so as to reduce overall risks to the health of workers,
consumers or the environment without shifting risks between workers, consumers or parts
of the environment.1 73
Several precedents exist for such structural reforms, and an
examination of them provides us with a detailed model for a
"preventative design" strategy. Such a strategy takes a "precautionary
approach" to preventing type II errors by creating a presumption of
harm and translates this presumption into a comprehensive new
procedure and administrative framework for regulation of the entire
production process.
A. Precedents for Structural Reform
Historically, initial demands for a more precautionary approach
arose from the deteriorating state of the shared rivers and enclosed seas
of northern Europe. In the North Sea, for example, surprising
i72 W. Ryan & R. Schrader, An Ounce of Toric Pollution Prevention: Rating Stale? Taxic Use
Reduction Laws (National Enironmental Law Center (Boston) and the Center for Policy
Alternatives (Washington, D.C.), 1991) at 3.
1 73 Aid. at 4.
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events-massive algal blooms which caused serious damage to fisheries,
marine mammal epidemics, die-offs, and a rising incidence of fish
diseases-escalated in the 1980s despite the absence of clear
cause-and-effect explanations. In the mid-1980s, new concepts such as
"low waste/non-waste and low-emission/non-emission technologies"
were being considered to deal with an emerging crisisj 74 A number of
national governments, notably those of Germany and the Netherlands,
began to move toward a more preventative or "precautionary"
approach1 75 with new legislation that sought to encourage waste
prevention and clean technology. These goals have been promoted
through licensing and siting requirements for waste management
facilities, operational standards, and the wide use of economic incentives
such as pollution charges and direct financial support for research,
development, and implementation of so-called clean technologies.
For example, in 1986, amendments to the Waste DisposalActI76
in the Federal Republic of Germany established, for the first time, the
prevention and reduction of waste as a national policy: no pollution
permit could be issued unless the applicant had demonstrated that all
possibilities for waste minimization had been exhausted! 7 Legislation
provides for the development of catalogues of alternative technologies
and uniform technical standards for various industrial sectors. Similarly,
the Netherlands has put in place an overall strategy to improve waste
management and to encourage waste minimization, including financial
support for the development and implementation of new waste
minimization technologies and better industrial "housekeeping"
practices. The overall goal of these systems is to internalize the costs of
"pollution and waste control into the production methods so that
compliance with pollution and waste limitations becomes a normal and
necessary part of maintaining an efficient operation." 178
1 74 For a detailed discussion of this history, see L Basset aL,Protection of the North Sea: Tune
for Clean Production (Rotterdam: Erasmus Centre for Environmental Studies, 1990).
175 For an early elucidation of the precautionary approach, see V. Dethlefsen, "Marine
Pollution Mismanagement: Towards the Precautionary Concept" (1986) 17:2 Marine Poll. Bull. 54.
1767 June 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI.i) 1410.
1 77 See A.C. Williams, "A Study of Hazardous Waste Minimization in Europe: Public and
Private Strategies to Reduce Production of Hazardous Waste" (1987) 14 Envtl. Affairs 165 at 177;
and "Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection" (1989), Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (oEcD), Paris. The OECD study reviews a variety of economic
instruments (pollution charges, subsidies, deposit-refund systems, market systems, and enforcement
incentives) in several European countries and the United States.
1 78 Williams, ibid, at 195.
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Similarly, in the United States, early signs of a new approach
were evident by the id-1980s. The 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act179 outlined
a national policy on waste management, which stated that "wherever
feasible, the generation of hazardous waste, is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as possible." Included in the amendments
were requirements that firms using or manufacturing toxics must report
their efforts to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste prior to
treatment. In 1986, the United States Office of Technology Assessment
(usoTA) released a landmark report which advocated shifting
government policy from pollution control to waste reductionj 8 0 This
report argued that pollution prevention is superior to pollution control
as it: (1) benefits the government because less waste will enter the
environment and thus the risk of mismanagement and costs of
environmental treatment and remediation will be reduced, (2) benefits
companies through reduced waste treatment expenses, and (3) benefits
society because it conserves materials and slows the depletion of nature's
virgin reiource basej 81
This cause has been taken up most aggressively at the state,
rather than the federal, level, with the 1989 Massachusetts Toxic Use
Reduction Act 82 setting the U.S. national standard.183 In response to
substantial public interest pressure from the National Toxics
Campaign,184 the new legislation establishes a statewide goal of reducing
toxic waste generation by 50 per cent by 1997. Its approach is to shift the
domain of intervention
up into the production process where decisions traditionally have been management
prerogatives well hidden from public review ... [The approach] relies more on
government-mandated planning, goal-setting and performance standards coupled with
government technical assistance and financial incentives.185
179 Pub. L No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221.
280 Supra note 101.
181 IbI at 14-15.
1 82 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 211 (West 1993) [hereinafter TURA]. For discussions of the Act,
see K. Geiser, "Toxics Use Reduction and Pollution Prevention" (1990) New SoL 1; and Sandborn
et al., supra note 7 at 86-89.
183 For a comparison often different state laws, see Ryan & Schrader, supra note 172.
184 See generally, S. Lewis & M. Kaltofen, "From Poison to Prevention: A White Paper on
Replacing Hazardous Waste Facility Siting With Toxics Reduction" (Boston, The National Toxics
Campaign Fund, 1989).
185 Geiser, supra note 182 at 1-2.
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To achieve this, the Act requires initiatives on four fronts:
"administrative reorganization, toxics use reduction planning, creation
of a research and training institute, and state-mandated performance
standards for targeted industrial sectors."186 The first initiative requires
the state to establish an Office of Toxics Use Reduction Assistance and
Technology1s7 to coordinate the shift in policy. Toxics use reduction1ss
is to be encouraged by requiring firms which manufacture or use any
substance on a special chemical substance list1s9 to file annual chemical
inventories °90 by production unit, and to indicate their progress in
pollution reduction by keeping score under formalized "use reduction"
and "waste reduction" indices. Beginning in 1994, these firms have been
required to prepare "toxics use reduction plans"191 which are to be
updated every two years. The plans must include information on past
and projected changes in toxic chemical use, assessments of available
technologies or chemical substitutes that would reduce toxic chemical
use, and schedules for the introduction of economically feasible
reduction technologies or practices.
Under the third initiative, the state will establish a Toxics Use
Reduction Institute,1 92 the first of its kind in the United States,
dedicated solely to encouraging and assisting industries in the reduction
of toxic chemical use and toxic waste generation. The Institute is
mandated to develop ways of substituting safer materials for the toxic
substances presently used and generated by manufacturing processes.
186 lbid at 6.
187 See the TURA, supra note 182 at § 7.
188 Toxics use reduction is defined in § 1 of the TUBA, ibid. as
in-plant changes in production processes or raw materials that reduce, avoid, or eliminate
the use of toxic or hazardous substances or generation of hazardous by-products per unit
of production, so as to reduce risks to the health of workers, consumers, or the
environment, without shifting risks between workers, consumers, or the environment.
It is to be achieved through the following methods: input substitution; product reformulation;
production unit redesign, modification, or modernization; improved operation and maintenance of
production unit equipment and methods; and recycling, reuse, or extended use of toxics. Further,
"toxics use reduction shall not include or in any way be inferred to promote or require incineration,
transfer from one medium of release or discharge to other media, off-site or out-of-production unit
waste recycling, or methods of end-of-pipe treatment of toxics as waste!'
189 See the TBA, supra note 182 at § 9. The basis for this list is the Toxic Chemical list
defined in § 313 of the American Emergency Planning and Right-to-KnowAct (Pub. L. No. 99-499,
1986). The list will be expanded over the first four years of administering the TURA.
190 See the TVRA, supra note 182 at § 10.
1 91 biA § 11.
192 /b § 6.
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The Institute acts as a clearinghouse for information on source
reduction and clean technologies. Finally, the TURA grants authority to
the state to target specific industrial sectors1 93 where it appears that new
technologies or practices could achieve significant source reduction.
The state can set performance standards to pressure firms to achieve
these high levels of reduction.
In October 1990, the American federal government passed the
Pollution Prevention Act-7 4 which also sets out a national policy on
pollution prevention and source reduction. The preamble states that
pollution should be prevented or reduced at source ... Pollution that cannot be prevented
should be recycled in an environmentally safe manner ... and disposal or other release
into the environment should be employed only as a last resort.
TheAct is intended to improve Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
data collection systems and the dissemination of information regarding
the reduction of toxic emissions in all media, and to assist the
government in providing information on, and technical assistance for,
source reduction. Under the Pollution Prevention Act, the Administrator
of the EPA will establish an office that will develop and implement a
strategy to promote source reduction;1 95 investigate methods of
coordinating, streamlining, and improving public access to data collected
under existing environmental statutes; develop an inventory of existing
data; and consider developing consistent report formats, nomenclature
and data storage and retrieval systemsP 6 This office will also establish
liaison groups with industry, public interest groups, state source
reduction programme officials, and an Advisory Panel of technical
experts.197 In addition, the Administrator of the EPA will establish a
Source Reduction Clearinghouse to compile information on
management, technical, and operational approaches to source
reduction.198 The Clearinghouse will serve as .a centre for source
reduction technology transfers and will promote the adoption of source
reduction technologies through extensive education programmes.
Although theAct does not include regulatory provisions, it is intended to
encourage preventative action by establishing a national policy of waste
193 ISbd § 14.
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reduction through the exchange of information and the establishment of
a hierarchy of waste management solutions-with source reduction as
the preferred option, and disposal as a last resort.
Both conceptually and in practice, Canadian legislative policy
lags far behind these initiatives. Internationally, the International Joint
Commission (of which Canada is a co-member with the United States)
has, since 1978, articulated in its Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
the goal of "zero discharge" for persistent toxic pollutants 9 9 To help
achieve this, in 1990, the Commission called for a reverse onus provision
so that a chemical should be assumed to be harmful unless demonstrated
otherwise.200 Nationally and provincially, however, despite the fact that
3.5 million tonnes of hazardous wastes are generated annually by
Canadian industry, "there is neither an explicit national policy nor
legislative provisions promoting source reduction." 20 1 Meanwhile, many
provincial governments remain within the old regulatory paradigm, still
proposing procedures, such as that recently put forward by British
Columbia, for the use of the "best available control technology" (BAcr)
[emphasis added].202 A recent strategy presently under consideration in
British Columbia does, however, contemplate a more preventative
approach in the future.' 3
199 See the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, signed at Ottawa, 22 November
1978, and the Phosphorus Load Reduction Supplement, signed 7 October 1983. Zero discharge is
articulated in Annex 12. For a current discussion of this, seeA Prescription for Healthy Great Lakes:
Report of the Program for Zero Discharge (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and
Policy, February 1991) [hereinafterA Prescription for Healty Great Lakes].
2 0 0 Fifth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality, Part 1l, (1990), 21. In its Sixth
Biennial Report, supra note 148 at 2 and 3, the Commission noted that we "have not yet virtually
eliminated, nor achieved zero discharge, of any persistent toxic substance" so that it "is time to ask
whether we really want to continue attempts to manage persistent toxic substances ... [or] begin to
eliminate andprevent their existence in the ecosystem in the first place" [emphasis in original].
2 0 1 Muldoon & Vallante, supra note 7 at 74. In its 1990 Green Plan, the federal government
has called for the "virtual elimination of discharges of persistent toxic substances into the
environmenL" The policy does not address the need for source reduction and is still subject to the
existing drawn-out screening procedures under the CEPA See Canada's Green Plan For a Healthy
Environment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990) at 43.
202 Waste Discharge Criteria Based on (BAcT) Best Available Control Technology (Victoria:
Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, 1991). For a critique of this draft proposal, see wcmR
newsletter, 15:5 (12 February 1991).
203 New regulations require the elimination of organodblorines in pulp mill effluent by 31
December 2002. As of 31 December 1995, the interim discharge limit will be 1.5 Kg of AOX per
tonne of pulp produced. See Pulp Il and Pulp and Paper Mill Effluent Control Regulations, B.C.
Reg. 470/90. Permittees may be exempted from the interim limit if a plan and timetable is
submitted to the Waste Management Branch (WVB) Director for the elimination of AOX on or
before 31 December 2000. Not suprisingly, these regulations are opposed by industry and are being
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B. Preventative Design:'A Model
While the challenge to the assumption of assimilative capacity
was initiated in a few European countries in the mid-1980s, under
prodding from international non-governmental organizations (NGos) and
individual states,204 several international bodies, such as the Oslo and
Paris Commissions,2 05 began reforming their regulatory approach
because they recognized that it was necessary to act upon the
scientifically based presumption of a causal link "even when there is no
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the
effects." 2 6 Thus, the 1990 Ministerial Declaration of the Third
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea states that
the Ministers will "take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of
substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even
where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between
emissions and effects."
207
implemented gradually with the assistance of a professional mediator and through a broad
participatory negotiation process.
204 See, for example, the submission by the lead international Noo in this area, Greenpeace
International, "A Critical Analysis of the Assimilative Capacity Approach," to the Thirteenth
Meeting of the London Dumping Convention (Lc) Scientific Group on Dumping, International
Maritime Organisation, Document No. LDC/SG/13/8/2 (London, 1990). Submissions by several
national delegations to the wVC's 13th meeting in April 1990 were also critical of the assimilative
capacity approach to protecting the marine environment. See, for example, Germany's "Remarks
on the Assessment of Data and the Principle of Precautionary Action," Doc. LDC/SG 13/8/1.
2 05 See the (Oslo) Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships
and Aircraft, 1972, 11 IL.M. 262, and the (Paris) Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 1974, 13 LL.M. 352. These regional European commissions,
hereafter referred to as osCOM and PARCOM, share a common secretariat and together provide the
regulatory framework for national legislation and international coordination for the environmental
protection of the north-east Atlantic, including the heavily contaminated North Sea. Their member
states include, inter alia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
206 On the Principle of Precautionary Action, PARCOM Recommendation 89/1 of 22 June 1989
at Art. 2, 2 (a). This approach led, for example, to that organization's banning all industrial waste
dumping at sea.
2 07fMni.sterial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of the North
Sea (The Hague: International Maritime Organisation (imo), 7-8 March 1990) at 5. Participation in
the conference included the Ministers, responsible for the protection of the North Sea and the
rivers entering the North Sea, from Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the European
Community. This approach contrasts, for example, with the federal Pulp and Paper Effluent
Regulations in Canada, which ignore both persistence and cumulative effects in the receiving
environment by setting permissible levels of discharge in units of pollution per unit of production
(e.g., 1.5 kg AOX per tonne of pulp), thus increasing the overall level of discharges in direct
proportion to increases in the levels of production.
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Acceptance of such an approach is now widespread in the
international regulatory community2"8 In August 1990, for example, the
United Nations Environment Program's (uNEP) Governing Council
endorsed a comprehensive approach to hazardous waste management,
which
[a]ppeals to governments and appropriate international forums taking economic costs
into consideration to consider alternative clean production methods-including raw
material selection, product substitution, and clean production technologies and
processes-as a means of implementing a precautionary approach in order to promote
production systems which minimize or eliminate the generation of hazardous wastes and
optimize use of raw materials, water and energy, for example through recycling.
209
In June 1989, the European Contracting Parties of the Oslo
Commission (oscoM) adopted a policy to reduce and terminate the
dumping of all industrial wastes into the marine environmentPO This
decision represents both a sweeping application of the precautionary
principle to hazardous and other wastes, and a new approach to making
such decisions. It states:
that the dumping of industrial wastes inthe North Sea shall cease by 31 December 1989,
and in other parts of Convention waters by 31 December 1995, ... except[ing] ... those
industrial wastes for which it can be shown to the Commission through the Prior
Justification Procedure (pip) both that there are no practical alternatives on land and that
the materials cause no harm in the marine environment.
In developing a model for preventative design, two elements
stand out: a new philosophical base, the "precautionary principle," which
replaces the assumption of assimilative capacity; and a practical strategy
208 Two authors, active in the negotiations, K.C. Stairs & PA. Johnston in their article "The
Precautionary Action Approach to Environmental Protection" (1991) 1-ICEP.1 Envtl. Poll. 473,
cite, at 475, the following fora which have adopted the precautionary approach. the North Sea
Ministerial Conferences; the unm' Governing Council; the Paris and Oslo Commissions; the
Barcelona Convention; the Nordic Council's International Parliamentarian Conference on
Pollution of the Seas; the Nordic Council of Ministers; the European Community (ac) Parliament;
the European Economic Community (Ec) (the June 1990 "Environmental Imperative"); the
Bergen Conference (ECE) Ministerial Declaration; and the Vienna Convention on the Protection of
the Ozone Layer. See also J. Cameron & J. Abouchar, "The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment" (1991) 24
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1. The authors, at 14 and 20, argue that the wide acceptance of the
precautionary principle in national and international instruments indicates its emergence as
customary international law.
209 urNE Governing Council, Second Special Session, Nairobi, Kenya, 1-3 August 1990,
Decision No. SS.U/4 at 41.
210 Convention for the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft (Fifteenth Meeting of the Oslo Commission (oscoM)), On the Reduction and Cessation of
DumpingIndustrial Wastes at Sea, Decision 89/1 (Dublin, 14 June 1989).
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for implementation, which includes such processes as the "prior
justification procedure."
1. The precautionary principle and statistical power
The essential reference point of the preventative design
approach is the precautionary principle. 211 This principle was first
developed in Germany (vorsorgenprinzip), but was formalized as an
operational legal principle in the Ministerial Declaration of the Second
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea in 1987. In
it, the ministers
accept the principle of safeguarding the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by reducing
pollution emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bloacaimulate at
source by the use of the best available technology and other appropriate measures. This
applies especially when there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects
on the living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even when
there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects ("the
principle ofprecauionay action").212 [emphasis added]
A regulatory approach based on this principle highlights the uncertainty
of scientific information by recognizing the necessity to act with caution
even when causal links between emissions and effects have not been
proven. An inherent component of the preventative design approach is
that the burden of proof should not be on the environmental agency to
demonstrate harm conclusively, but rather on the prospective polluter to
demonstrate a lack of harm.
This early formulation of the principle clearly covers substances
that are "persistent, toxic, and liable to bioaccumulate," but it has also
been expanded in more recent formulations. For example, the Nordic
Council's Conference on Pollution of the Seas refers more broadly to the
need for an effective precautionary approach: we must "[eliminate and
prevent] pollution emissions where there is reason to believe that
damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even where there is
inadequate or inconclusive scientific evidence to prove a causal link
2 11 For an early discussion of the concept, see Dethlefsen, supra note 175. The author, at 56,
attributes the introduction of this concept to W. Kohlhamnmer (1980), Rat von Sachverstandigen fur
Umweltfragen, Umnwelt-probleme der Nordsee, Sondergutachten, Stuttgart.
212 1988,27 LL.M. 835 at 840.
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between emissions and effects."213 This refers not merely to toxic
substances, but to any "pollution emissions."
This broad definition of the precautionary principle has not been
without its detractors, who have argued that "acceptance of the
precautionary principle is entirely an administrative and legislative
matter and has nothing to do with science" 214 and should, therefore, be
restricted to clearly dangerous substances which are known to be toxic,
persistent, and bioaccumulative. Some scientists have challenged the
precautionary principle for its avowed lack of statistical rigor because it
implies that one presumes an effect to exist despite the lack of
statistically significant evidence of that effect.2ZS Essentially, it is argued
that standard, classical statistical methods must be used, and that the
result must be statistically significant before one concludes that an effect
exists. This challenge, although put forward by several scientists, again
reveals the widespread failure to recognize the concepts of type H errors
and statistical power, let alone the equally rigorous procedures of
statistical power analysis.?Y6 While power analysis may not have been
applied explicitly to the marine pollution cases that led to the
precautionary principle, the underlying concerns of that principle
specifically parallel those of type II errors and statistical power. Thus, a
major theme of the precautionary principle is the control not merely of
toxic substances, where the toxicity (or persistence or bioaccumulative
character) has already been demonstrated, but of any substances, whose
"safety" has not yet been demonstrated.
Indeed, in reviewing the debate about the principle, it can be
seen that its advocates argue in precisely these terms-even though, by
not referring to statistical power, they too may be unaware of the
concept or, at least, of its importance. Two commentators argue that the
precautionary principle has "considerable scientific rigour" with a
213 Nordic Council's Conference on Pollution of the Seas, Copenhagen, 1989. This
conference included members of parliament from Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Germany, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the autonomous territories of Faroe Island,
Greenland, and Aland Island.
2 1 4 J.S. Gray, "Statistics and the Precautionary Principle" (April 1990) 21 Marine Poll. Bull.
174.
2 15 In addition to Gray, extensive debate has occurred within the LDC's Scientific Group on
Dumping where, according to one report, "[a]ttitudes varied from annoyed incomprehension to
something that seemed to negate the role of science in policy making": Jackson & Taylor, supra
note 171 at 3.
216 R.M. Peterman & M. M'Gonigle, "Statistical Power Analysis and the Precautionary
Principle" (1992) 23-5 Marine Poll. Bull. 231.
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broader applicability to any polluting discharge, because "it protects
against initiating discharges of potentially harmful substances in the
absence of adequate information. Current practices can only be
effective as part of a process of retrospective damage limitation."
217 The
explicit use of statistical power analysis should, however, help to resolve
this debate by providing the requisite scientific underpinning for the
principle's broader application to any discharges (indeed, any industrial
activities at all) the environmental impacts of which are uncertain.
For example, where a scientific study has failed to reject the null
hypothesis of no effect of some substance, one can calculate statistical
power a posteriori, i.e., the probability that a specified magnitude of
effect, if present, could have been detected statistically given the sample
size used, experimental design, and other related information. 218 If
power were low (less than 0.95) for that specified size of effect, claims of
harmlessness should not be taken seriously since the test was too weak to
detect that effect and there is, therefore, a chance that harm could occur
in the future. However, if the null hypothesis of no effect were not
rejected, and if power were acceptably high (0.95 or greater) for
detecting the specified effect size, statements concerning the lack of the
specific type and magnitude of harm tested for should be given weight.
However, such conclusions of no harm would apply only under the
specific conditions tested. In many instances, it is impossible to conduct
separate tests for the full range of anticipated types of harm. This is
because of the possibility of synergistic and cumulative effects, the wide
range of types and life stages of organisms exposed, and the great variety
of potentially harmful effects associated with some activities. We
outlined these problems with typical experimental studies earlier in this
paper.
Thus, those wanting to discharge some substance could be
required to (1) conduct tests that cover a wide range of conditions in
which that substance could be anticipated to be potentially harmful, (2)
show that there is no harmful effect in any of the tests, and (3) show in
all of the tests that statistical power is high (e.g., > 0.95). Clearly,
discharges would not be permitted if at least one type of unacceptable
harmful effect was found. Depending on the relative costs of type I and
type II errors, precautionary action regarding the discharge may be
appropriate when tests are conducted for all anticipated harmful effects,
no harmful effects are found, and statistical power is low (e.g., < 0.95).
2 1 7 p. Johnston & M. Simmonds, "Precautionary Principle" (1990) 21:8 Marine Poll. Bull. 402.
2 18 See supra notes 8-16.
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In this way, precautionary action could be placed in a more objective and
rigorous framework to identify situations in which it is justified. This
approach is necessary because there have been numerous cases
(discussed above) in which substances, assumed to be safe, have turned
out to be harmful, and the costs of type II errors have been great.
In their discussion, Jackson and Taylor begin to acknowledge this
latter point when they note:
it is clear to us that the [precautionary] principle can and should be logically extended to
any potentially harmful substance. It should not be forgotten that cr-cs were once
classified as harmlessly non-toxic and do not bioaccumulate, yet their persistence and
chemical properties have the capacity for massive perturbation of the global
ecosystem.2 19
The precautionary principle thus presumes that any regulatory
procedure should begin with a presumption against the discharge of
wastes unless the proponent can adequately demonstrate that harm is
not likely to occur. Where tests are conducted to assess whether a
discharge is or will be harmful, statistical power analysis is relevant for
designing experiments, before they are implemented, that will have a
high probability of detecting a specified level of effect, if it exists. If field
or experimental data fail to show such an effect, a posteriori power
analysis can indicate the probability of detecting that size of effect. If
power is high, discharges might be permitted; if not, discharges might be
prevented, depending on the relative costs of errors. These principles
for action would add an important and essential element to all legislative
approaches, especially those that shift the burden of proof onto industry
to show that their products or processes are "safe."
2. Prior justification procedure
With the precautionary principle replacing the assumption of
assimilative capacity as the scientific foundation for environmental
regulation, a new procedure for translating this into practice is
necessary. The use of statistical power analysis above is only one
element of a possible strategy for implementing procedures. Although
such procedures will clearly vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
219 Supra note 171 at 31-32. With this in mind, they formulate, at 32, what they call "the
principle of precautionary action": "The release into the environment of unnatural substances or
natural substances in unnaturally large quantities should be avoided so far as is ecologically
sensible." This definition puts a lot of weight on the phrase "ecologically sensible" which the
authors define in light of varying degrees of likely harm.
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so-called prior justification procedure (pip) being developed in a number
of international fora (especially oscoM) provides a useful model of the
necessary framework and institutional components applicable
internationally, including in Canada. (Some similarities to several of the
national procedures discussed above exist.) In addition to its recognition
of the limits of the assimilative capacity approach, Pip involves
governments in a regulatory process which seeks to overcome the
practical limitations of testing and enforcement imposed on
environmental agencies by the paradigm of permissive regulation.
The rp consists of a series of steps with which an applicant for a
permit to dispose of waste at sea must comply. Figure 1220 illustrates a
generic schematic relationship of this procedure. The application may
be rejected at several stages as it passes through the schematic
framework in an itinerate manner. The first hurdle to pass through is a
"Prohibition Box" (Box 1). Wastes and waste sources on this list are
known to be hazardous enough to be prohibited on the basis of the
application of sound waste management principles.2 1 If an application
passes through the prohibition stage, it goes to the first assessment stage
(Boxes 2 and 3) conducted by the Regional Offices of Technology
Assessment (ROTA).
220 This figure is based on the permit framework of oscom and that presently being
considered by the L c under its so-called New Assessment Procedure (NAP). See the Report to the
Oslo Commission:Justifcationforthe Issue of Permit for the Dumping of Industrial Wastes at Sea (12-
14 June 1989); and the International Maritime Organisation, Consideration of the Report of the Third
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Erperts on theAnnexes to the London Dumping Convention Doec. No.
LDCVSG 13t2 at Annex 3 (London: 28 February 1990).
An application for disposal at sea may be rejected at six stages of the process. Applicants are
required to perform waste prevention audits (Box 2), consider alternative waste management
options (Box 3), and supply information regarding the character of the waste (Boxes 4, 5, and 6).
The disposal method and effects on the regional seas are also taken into consideration when an
application is reviewed. Finally, all proposed alternatives are compared and a permit is granted
only if the sea is the preferred option. Any convention member country may object to an
application through the Prior Notification Procedure. This is further discussed below.
221 In addition to known hazardous products, it may be possible to regulate substances on the
basis of their inherent chemical structure; that is, to shift the basis of regulation away from proof of
adverse effects to the likelihood of such effects given the inherent structure of the discharged
substance.
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FIGURE 1: The Prior Justification Procedure
REJECr 1
Assessmentby ROTA:
Consideration of Alternatives (Boxes 2 and 3)










ROTA take on a critical function in the decision framework,
assessing permit applications, and providing information on the
technological factors and economic considerations of pollution
prevention through source reduction and clean technologies. ROTA
review applications in terms of the character of the waste, the degree to
which waste reduction and prevention occurs at the source, and the
availability of technologically feasible alternatives to disposal. This is a
two-step process consisting of a so-called waste prevention audit
followed by a consideration of waste management options. The waste
prevention audit is required of any new applicant or existing permit
holder on a regular basis222 and must describe: (1) the types, amount,
and relative hazard of wastes generated; (2) details of the production
process and of the sources of waste within that process; and (3) the
feasibility of techniques of waste prevention through clean technologies.
In general, information submitted in the application must include the
investigation results of (1) alternative production and recycling
processes; (2) separation of critical waste components by cleaning
procedures; (3) destruction of the waste or its critical components; (4)
economic considerations of options mentioned in (1) and (2); and (5)
the environmental consequences and health risks of different options. If
the required audit reveals that opportunities exist for waste prevention
at the source, the applicant must formulate and implement a waste
prevention strategy, including specific waste reduction targets and
provisions for further audits to monitor progress towards these targets.
Permit issuance or renewal is subject to compliance with this
requirement.
The application must also indicate that a full range of waste
management options has been considered. Pip establishes a so-called
hierarchical approach to waste minimization based on the following
prioritization: (1) waste prevention; (2) on-site recycling; (3) re-use; (4)
destruction of hazardous constituents; (5) treatment to reduce or
remove the hazard; and (6) disposal into land, air and water.
Disposal-that is, permitted discharge-is the last option available. In
comparing alternatives, some of the factors that must be taken into
account are the projected emissions of pollutants (into all media); the
risk of accidental emissions; the potential for control over both projected
and accidental emissions; the projected effect on indigenous species; the
risk of greater harm than projected; the risk of contamination of water
supplies and the food chain; the potential for control over these risks;
and, finally, the potential for remedial action in cases of contamination.
2 22 OCOM permits must be reviewed every three years.
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This hierarchy reflects a negative view of the permissive regulatory
approach that has historically relied on the last waste management
option of disposal. Indeed, it is interesting to note that risk-benefit
analysis and environmental impact assessment, to the extent that they
are evaluating discharges of effluents, the safety of which has not been
"proven," are relegated near the bottom of the hierarchy.
The waste must be fully characterized with respect to its origin,
the amount to be disposed of, the frequency of disposal, and the
chemical, physical, and biological properties (Boxes 4, 5 and 6). In
addition, the applicant must characterize the proposed disposal method
and disposal area, and assess the risk to the environment (Boxes 7 and
8). If, on the basis of the information provided, ROTA decide that
alternatives are available which have not been considered, or if the
assessment of the impact of alternatives indicates that the proposed
form of disposal is not a preferable option, then the application is
rejected at this stage. The final stage at which an application may be
rejected is through the Prior Notification Procedure which allows for
other states to object to, or comment on, the proposed disposal
operation. An objection must state what alternatives are available or
why the proposed operation is considered harmful, and must be
supported by scientific argument.
In addition to the strong presumption against ocean disposal in
OSCOM's Pip, the regulatory framework of OSCOM shifts the onus onto the
applicant, who must then conduct the necessary research and provide
sufficient information on the key factors which constrain the use of
alternatives. The role of an independent office of technology assessment
is thus central to the procedure. This structure inherently encourages
state-of-the-art source reduction and stimulates governments into a
technology-forcing role-in other words, regulation by preventative
design. Furthermore, although there is no reversal of the "burden of
proof" in a judicial sense, the administrative permit procedure is rooted
in a presumption against disposal, imposing on the applicant a duty to
provide the necessary evidence. Moreover, the common problems of
poor or incomplete industry reporting are reduced by the Pjp's provision
for "external review."
3. Clean production
Unlike the paradigm of permissive regulation, which is rooted in
the assumption of an almost limitlessly accommodating environment,
preventative design is driven by the recognition that our industrial.
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processes must ultimately fit within a sustainable, and limited,
environmental context. So long as this was not recognized, substantive
goals for industrial regulation were not necessary. Given the mounting
problems discussed above, this is clearly no longer possible. Those
countries and international institutions leading the way in the
development of a new regulatory paradigm recognize this situation, and
the need which it imposes on the decision maker to shift, from reliance
upon an endless process of discharging pollutants, to designing a
substantive end-point for regulatory intervention-clean production.
Economic instruments play an important role in the industrial
transition to the clean production technologies that are implicit in the
in. The "polluter pays" principle was first endorsed by the member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (oEcD) in 1972. At this time, it was agreed in principle
that environmental policies should reflect a commitment to an
internalization of the costs of pollution prevention and control measures
in such a way that a more rational use of scarce environmental resources
is encouraged. The "polluter pays" principle requires that the polluter
bear the expense of pollution prevention and control by factoring it into
the overall cost of production in the same way that the costs of raw
materials, energy, and labour are accounted for. In general, however,
under the permissive approach, such instruments as "effluent charges"
have not been oriented to achieving efficiently an absolute reduction in
pollution levels, but more to allocating discharges efficiently among
specific competing industries,
Without some end-point in mind, however, the charging process
still produces an "inefficient" utilization of scarce capital and
environmental resources. On the one hand, the permissive approach to
environmental pollution is expensive. As Muldoon and Valiante
remark:
As regulation becomes more stringent and complex, it becomes more expensive for
government to develop standards, evaluate permit applications and enforce compliance,
and for industry .. "because it requires substantial investment in control equipment,
which uses substantial amounts of energy and other resources to operate and creates
residues that are costly to treat or dispose of."2 23
Despite such costs, this pattern of regulation has resulted in massive
economic externalities, especially when remediation costs are included,
such as the $6 billion estimated over the next thirty years to contain and
2 23 Supra note 7 at 66, quoting P. Muldoon & M. Valiante, Zero Discharge:A Strategy for the
Regulation of Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes Ecosystem (Toronto: Canadian Environmental
Law Research Foundation, 1988) at 43.
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clean up just four of the largest leaking dumps on the American side of
the Niagara River.224 On the other hand, advocates of "clean
production" point to numerous examples of profitable industrial
transition,225 while independent analysts often dismiss industry
arguments (as in the Canadian pulp and paper industry226) that they
cannot afford to clean up. Indeed, with some countries clearly moving
ahead with a policy of industrial clean production, failure to pay the full
costs of production when other industries are doing so is not merely
poor business planning, but might even be considered an unfair subsidy
which could jeopardize the international competitiveness of the
industry.22 7
Under the preventative approach, economic incentives are used
more broadly to foster clean production. Clean production is
a conceptual and procedural approach to production that demands that all phases of the
life-cycle of a product or of a process should be addressed with the objective of
prevention or the minimization of short and long-term risks to humans and to the
environment. 22
Clean production envisions a range of strategies including good
housekeeping, on-site closed-loop recycling, input substitution, process
modification, low-impact technologies, and product reformulation.
Economic instruments can be used in any one of these areas, including
penalizing the very use of toxic substances in the production process.
For example, fees for the use of toxic substances are being implemented
to finance progressive waste reduction initiatives created under
2 24 SeeA Prescription for Healthy Great Lakes, supra note 199 at 7.'
225 See, for example, D. Huisingh et aL, Proven Profits from Pollution Prevention: Case Studies
in Resource Conservation and Waste Reduction (Washington: Institute for Local Self-Reliance,
1986.
22 6 See Sinclair, supra note 36 at 95- 96, who notes that "the vast majority of mills operating in
Canada during 1988 could have adopted the latest in available effluent control [at a cost of $14 per
tonne, and that this] .. would not pose a threat to any but the least efficient of those operating
within the industry."
2 27 In his much-praised report on Canadian competitiveness, Canada at the Crossroads: The
Reality of a New Competitive Environment (1991) at 58, M. Porter notes:
Stringent standards and regulations for product performance and environmental impact
can create and upgrade competitive advantage by pressuring firms to improve product
and process quality .. With some exceptions, [Canadian] environmental standards have
rarely been at the forefront of international practices, with the result that industries such
as pulp and paper are having to undertake substantial investments simply to catch up.
228 Bass etal., supra note 174 at 19.
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legislation such as the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act.2 29
Economic incentives also play an important role in achieving waste
minimization goals in many European countries. Positive economic
incentives, such as direct financial and technical assistance, are used to
promote the development and implementation of clean technologies.
Negative economic incentives are used to promote hazardous waste
minimization by increasing the cost of waste production, treatment, and
disposal. By being tied to a detailed analysis of the industrial processes
in use, this approach is also more easily implemented as part of the
permit procedure than the dominant Canadian system of judicially
enforced fines for end-of-pipe permit violations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have pointed out the frequent occurrence of
uncertainty in scientific studies of causes and effects, and have discussed
the concept of statistical power analysis as a means of quantifying the
probability of the kind of error that is often ignored: failing to detect a
specified effect when one is present. The prevalence of these type II
errors in the past and their high cost has led us to re-examine Canada's
model of environmental regulation in light of a more fully scientific
approach. In contrast to the piecemeal approach to reforming the
present paradigm of permissive regulation, the revolution in regulatory
strategies, evident in a diverse number of multilateral agencies, state and
national governments, points to a new paradigm which has gained wide
international acceptance. Canadian legislation, regulatory action, and
environmental decision making have yet to recognize this dramatic shift.
To facilitate this transition in Canada, a new approach is needed.
This new approach is that of preventative design. The permissive
model is no longer viable because it cannot work well in the face of the
large uncertainties presently found. Its failure demands a
comprehensive rethinking and restructuring of existing legislation, as
well as a basic reorientation of judicial decision making. Standards must
no longer be set without the recognition of uncertainty. Instead, the
inescapable presence of uncertainty should lead to a shift of the
2 2 9 An Act to Promote Reduced Use of Toxic and Hazardous Substances in the Commonwealth,
House Bill No. 6161, Boston, 26 June 1989. See especially § 19. The fee structure requires payment
of amounts consisting of a base fee, and additional amounts according to the number of employees
and the amount of chemicals used.
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regulatory burden onto those seeking to utilize, and profit from, our
common environment's questionable assimilative capacity.
Rigorous science recognizes the need to account for uncertainty.
The application of statistical power analysis to test design is a crucial
step, and this formal recognition of uncertainty can become the
foundation of the precautionary principle and the paradigm of
preventative design. This model of regulation now has precedents to
follow, including the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act, and
oscoM's Prior Justification Procedure. These precedents point to the
importance of new management techniques (economic penalties are an
essential tool) and agencies oriented to technology-forcing and industrial
design. As the review of American legislation concludes, "[g]overnment
action is needed to provide incentives and information to fundamentally
change industry's focus on pollution control towards toxics use
reduction."230 Similarly, the judiciary must be more cognizant of the
implications of scientific uncertainty in order to respond realistically and
imaginatively to problems of causation. Reallocating the burden of
proof from the environmental management agencies or public to the
polluter, and setting appropriate standards of proof, are important ways
to begin.
230 Ryan & Schrader, supra note 172 at 6.
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